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Introduction: Spirit of the 1917 Revolution 
“During the first two months of 1917 Russia was still a Romanov monarchy. Eight 
months later the Bolsheviks stood at the helm…You will not find another such sharp turn 
in history.”-        Lev Trotsky,1 
 
 
 By 1917 Russia had been at war for nearly two-and-a-half years. World War I, the 
most destructive conflict in human history up to that point, was a modern war where 
industry and technology were crucial to success on the battlefield, and few countries were 
as ill prepared to fight such a war as Imperial Russia. In 1914 Russia was one of the most 
backwards countries in Europe. Its industrialization over recent decades had not been 
rapid enough to compensate for a centuries-old legacy of poverty and destitution.  The 
journalist and historian William Chamberlin described Russia’s disadvantage as follows: 
“From the very beginning of hostilities the inferiority of the Russian military machine to 
the German in everything but sheer numbers was evident… At the outset Russia had sixty 
batteries of artillery against Germany’s three hundred and eighty-one. Russia had one 
kilometer of railroad mileage to every hundred square kilometers of territory, as against 
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 Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution (London: Pathfinder, 1980),  p. 18 
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Germany’s 10.6.”2 Russia’s lack of development was a serious detriment to its 
capabilities on the battlefield. 
During the war Imperial Russia mobilized over fifteen million men to fight. Such 
a large muster necessarily brought to the fore all of Russia’s many social ills. Serfdom 
had been abolished in 1861, but private agriculture had failed to develop in depth; large 
portions of the peasantry lived in similar conditions to those of their ancestors hundreds 
of years earlier. Urban workers lived in the basest of conditions. Russia’s nascent 
proletariat was rarely more than a generation or two removed from the countryside. From 
the workers’ perspective a small handful of well-connected aristocrats, cunning 
merchants, and shrewd industrialists lived in vulgar opulence. Naturally it was the 
peasants and the workers who bore the brunt of wartime sacrifice. The horrific conflict 
gave millions of common Russians a shared point of reference for their suffering, and it 
intensified social tensions. As Russia suffered defeat after defeat on the battlefield, 
popular unrest against the country’s absolute monarchy escalated.  
In February 1917 the masses had had enough. Strikes in Petrograd on 22-23 
February 1917 (New-Style: 7-8 March) quickly boiled over into a full-scale insurrection. 
When soldiers from the local garrison joined the protesters, the tsar’s time was up. On 2 
March (New-Style: 15 March) Tsar Nicholas II was forced to abdicate his throne: the 
three-hundred-year rule of the Romanov dynasty, as well as absolute monarchy itself, 
came to an end. The men and women who had taken to the streets to press for the tsar’s 
ouster were animated by at times conflicting demands: democracy, land reform, peace, 
and socialist economic policies were all popular objectives. Some protesters had called 
                                                          
2
 William Henry Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution: 1917-1918, From the Overthrow of the Tsar to the 
Assumption of Power by the Bolsheviks, Vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987),  p. 65 
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for power to pass to the soviets, elected bodies largely composed of the more radical 
representatives of Russia’s socialist parties, but governance was instead entrusted to a 
moderate provisional government. Throughout the summer and early fall of 1917 
conflicts between the soviets and the provisional government multiplied. The war 
continued to devastate Russian society and the economy fell into virtual collapse. A 
restive peasantry demanded comprehensive land reform, while the government vacillated.  
 As conditions deteriorated, so did the population’s faith in the political course of 
the provisional government. Calls for the soviets to seize power proliferated; within the 
soviets themselves the far-left Bolshevik Party grew increasingly powerful. Trotsky 
explained the Bolsheviks’ assessment of the situation: “The revolutionary tendencies of 
the masses, even at the moment of the February revolution, did not at all coincide with 
the compromise tendencies of the petty bourgeois parties. The proletariat and the 
peasantry voted for the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries not as compromisers, 
but as opponents of the czar, the capitalists and the landowners. But in voting for them 
they created a partition-wall between themselves and their own aims.”3 The Bolsheviks 
sought to knock over that wall. Under the leadership of the recently returned émigré, 
Vladimir Lenin, the Bolsheviks called for “all power to the soviets,” for “bread and 
peace,” and for the nationalization of industry. On 25 October, 1917 (New-Style: 7 
November) Lenin and the Bolsheviks led an armed uprising against the provisional 
government in Petrograd. After a day of fighting, the provisional government was 
overthrown. A Bolshevik Party that had never once been responsible for governing set 
out to translate its revolutionary ideology into reality.  
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Bolshevik leaders quickly discovered that it was much easier in practice to oppose 
power than to exercise it. Almost immediately, a conflict revealed itself between the 
egalitarian ideology of the party and the harsh reality of governing a nation of one 
hundred and fifty million people. Bolsheviks lamented what they saw as the 
dehumanizing forces of capitalism; many firmly believed their seizure of power would 
result in the triumph of a more just society. In their propaganda the Bolsheviks claimed 
they were taking power in the name of the soviets, an institution which in 1917 
represented a form of direct democracy. The soviets were to allow the impoverished 
masses a direct role in governing for the first time in Russia’s history. In the place of 
exploitative forms of industrial organization the Bolsheviks envisioned a workplace 
where the workers would control the means of production and organize their own labor in 
a fashion that was both more productive and more equitable. In the countryside, land was 
to be redistributed to the peasants who worked it; the ideal was a collective form of 
agriculture free from the gross inequalities that had for so long afflicted rural Russia. 
Even the military, traditionally the most authoritarian of institutions, was to be 
humanized and made more democratic. Ranks and harsh discipline were to be replaced 
with collegial forms of command and voluntary service. Last but not least, the state itself 
as a coercive institution was to wither away. Lenin summarized the Bolshevik ideal for 
the long term: “Socialism will shorten the working day, will raise the masses to a new 
life, will create conditions for the majority of the population that will enable everybody, 
without exception, to perform state functions, and this will lead to the complete withering 
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away of the state in general.”4 Some Bolshevik followers interpreted Lenin’s plan as a 
call for an immediate reduction in the state’s coercive powers. 
While many Bolsheviks had faith their program would indeed lead to a more just 
society, it was not without its violent, dictatorial overtones. The Bolsheviks took pride in 
their contempt for “bourgeois democracy.” They advocated a violent revolution that 
would forcibly suppress “class enemies.” What is more, the Bolsheviks paid lip-service to 
the principle of proletarian democracy but refused to honor it in practice. In its place, 
Lenin advocated a highly centralized, authoritarian party where an elite of socialist 
intellectuals would take power in the name of the workers. Since Russia was by its very 
nature backwards and lacked an advanced working-class, it would be necessary for a 
small party of intellectuals to implement those policies that were “truly” in the interests 
of the workers. To ensure political orthodoxy, this party would be closed to the majority 
of radicals who lacked proper “consciousness.” In reality the Bolshevik revolution would 
therefore involve the seizure of power by a tiny handful of revolutionary ideologues, not 
by the majority of the people. Nothing could be more authoritarian than a state where a 
numerically insignificant elite determines what is best for the rest of society, yet this is 
exactly the program to which the party adhered. Lenin stated: “Without the ‘dozen’ tried 
and talented leaders (and talented men are not born by the hundred), professionally 
trained, schooled by long experience and working in perfect harmony, no class in modern 
society is capable of conducting a determined struggle.”5 
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 Vladimir Lenin, from “The State and Revolution", in The Essential Works of Lenin: “What is to Be 
Done?” and Other Writings, ed. Henry M. Christman  (New York: Dover Publications, 1966),  p. 362 
5
 Vladimir Lenin, from “What is to Be Done?", in The Essential Works of Lenin: “What is to Be Done?” 
and Other Writings, ed. Henry M. Christman  (New York: Dover Publications, 1966),  p. 145 
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By 1917, a sizeable gap existed between the Bolsheviks’ chosen ends and the 
means they found acceptable to achieve them. Trotsky himself was not unaware of this 
contradiction. Following the rupture of the Russian Social Democratic Party in 1903, 
Trotsky had affiliated with the Menshevik wing that opposed Lenin’s more authoritarian 
Bolsheviks. He directly attacked Lenin for what he saw as “dictatorial tendencies.” Still 
over the course of 1917, the perceived vacillation of the provisional government had led 
Trotsky to become disillusioned with his Menshevik peers. By the summer of that year, 
he had had enough, and joined the Bolshevik Party. Trotsky saw the Bolsheviks as the 
only group capable of radically transforming society along Marxist lines. In joining a 
party that openly preached violence and minority rule, he embraced Lenin’s authoritarian 
vision of the revolution. In pursuing their reorganization of Russia, the Bolsheviks would 
in practice deny power to the very classes in whose name they governed. Trotsky’s 
biographer Isaac Deutscher gave a sympathetic portrayal of this dilemma: “The 
circumstance that the Bolsheviks were the party of the revolution impelled them first to 
identify the revolution with themselves, and then to reduce the revolution to being 
exclusively an affair of their party.”6  
Within months of seizing power, the Bolshevik Party entrusted Trotsky with the 
monumental task of creating an army for the socialist state. The Red Army would quickly 
become the largest agency in the nascent Bolshevik Republic. As a major institution, it 
provided a crucial example of the manner in which the party would negotiate between its 
egalitarian ideology and its stated preference for coercive methods. Trotsky promised his 
Red Army would represent a new type of army, emblematic of a new type of proletarian 
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state. Three years of brutal civil war would put this claim to the test. The results would 
radically impact the lives of millions of Soviet citizens and the future of Russia itself.   
The purpose of this thesis is to critically examine how the methods Trotsky used 
to create the Red Army affected both the outcome of the civil war and the evolution of 
the Bolshevik state. I will argue that Trotsky did not adhere to the party’s ideological 
orthodoxy while constructing the army. Instead, he built the army using methods he 
believed would lead to a Red victory. He did not hesitate to adopt features of the tsarist 
predecessor. This cost him political support, but ultimately led to a fighting force capable 
of victory. At the end of the war Trotsky took his success as an inducement to apply 
militarization to other areas of the Bolshevik state, including the economy. The 
devastation of war and popular unrest prevented him from fully implementing these 
ideas. I show that the trend of ideological compromise Trotsky embodied was 
symptomatic of a larger trend. By the end of the war the Bolshevik state had failed to 
make good on many of its ideological promises and alienated many supporters. The need 
to maintain power in this hostile atmosphere led to more compromising of Bolshevik 
ideals. 
To build my argument I have included three chapters. My first chapter outlines 
the growing military threats that greeted Trotsky’s appointment as War Commissar in 
1918. It documents Trotsky’s controversial adoption of “conventional” military policies 
including conscription, strict discipline, and the use of former tsarist officers. His 
pragmatism is contrasted with Bolshevik purists who argued for a strictly volunteer 
militia. The second chapter deals with the year 1919, which witnessed the bulk of the 
civil war’s fighting. It details Trotsky’s moderately successful defense of his military 
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policy at the 8th Party Congress in March 1919. Later in the year fighting escalated, and 
the Red Army successfully fought off serious challenges from Admiral Kolchak’s 
directorate in the east, General Denikin’s Volunteers in the south, and General 
Yudenich’s army in the northwest. The third and final chapter explores Trotsky’s attempt 
to apply military methods to the economy in 1920. War with Poland temporarily 
interrupted his experiment in the summer and fall. Economic collapse and widespread 
discontent amongst the citizenry forced Lenin to abandon militarization at the 10th Party 
Congress in 1921. The result was the New Economic Policy, a pragmatic retreat that 
echoed the ideological compromise witnessed during the building of the Red Army. 
My thesis draws on five volumes of Trotsky’s military writings from the Civil 
War period for its primary sources. These writings include policy memoranda, speeches, 
military orders, and other documents of interest. They offer valuable insight into both 
Trotsky’s thinking and into the methods he employed to build the army. I have also relied 
on numerous histories of Trotsky, the Red Army, and the Civil War. The most important 
biography of Trotsky is Isaac Deutscher’s three-volume series written in the 1950s, from 
which I have drawn extensively. Deutscher’s account borders on hagiography, but it 
recounts Trotsky’s life in great detail and is factually accurate. Trotsky also wrote his 
own autobiography, My Life. Other biographies are more recent, and include Robert 
Service’s Trotsky, Dmitri Volkogonov’s Trotsky: The Eternal Revolutionary, and 
Bertrand Patenaude’s Trotsky: Downfall of a Revolutionary--- which deals with 
Trotsky’s fall from political grace and exile from the USSR. 
Histories of the Civil War period in English began with William Chamberlin’s 
The Russian Revolution Vol. II, 1918-1921, which I have refrained from using heavily 
13 
 
due to its age. I have mainly relied on W. Bruce Lincoln’s Red Victory and Richard 
Pipes’ Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime. Lincoln’s work is the most thorough general 
narrative to date. Pipes’ account is highly critical of the Bolshevik regime, and highlights 
Bolshevik atrocities. Mark Von Hagen’s  Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship and 
Francesco Benvenuti’s The Bolsheviks and the Red Army, 1918-1922 offer insights into 
early Red Army policy. Norman Davies’ White Eagle, Red Star was a competent 
retelling of the Polish-Soviet War of 1920. Israel Getzler’s Kronstadt, 1917-1921 was an 
insightful window into both the Kronstadt mutiny and the transformation of Russia’s 
political climate during the civil war. Similarly, Robert Daniels’ Conscience of the 
Revolution and Vladimir Brovkin’s Behind the Frontlines of the Civil War provided 
critical information about the interplay between Russian society and Bolshevik politics 
during the war. 
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Chapter One--- Trotsky and the Beginning of the Civil War in 1917-1918 
 
“Comrades! Our Soviet Socialist Republic needs a well-organized army.”- Lev Trotsky7 
 
On 13 March 1918 Lev Davidovich Trotsky resigned his position as People’s 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The same day he replaced Nikolai Podvoisky as People’s 
Commissar for Army and Navy Affairs. Trotsky was also appointed Chairman of the 
Supreme Military Council, a military advisory body of former tsarist officers that he had 
helped to create weeks earlier. As Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Trotsky acted as the 
Bolshevik’s chief negotiator during the peace talks with Imperial Germany. These 
negotiations culminated in the unpopular Brest-Litovsk treaty that was signed on 3 
March. Just as peace with Germany had been the Bolsheviks’ principal concern in their 
first days of power, now security became a top Bolshevik priority. Enemies both foreign 
and domestic threatened to drive the Bolsheviks from power by force. In order to 
maintain its increasingly precarious control, the party would have to develop an effective 
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 Leon Trotsky, How the Revolution Armed: The Military Writings and Speeches of Leon Trotsky 
(London: New York: New Park Publications, 1979-1981), 5 volumes, Volume I: The Year 1918,  p. 19 
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military force to contain these threats.  As the leading figure in the nascent Red Army, 
Trotsky was being entrusted with the fate of the Bolshevik Republic. 
Trotsky’s appointment came as no surprise. He was widely recognized as one of 
the most intelligent leaders of the Bolshevik Party. For two decades he had been writing 
on questions of radical theory and socialist politics. He had demonstrated his loyalty to 
the revolutionary cause during two stints of imprisonment and exile under the tsar. He 
played a role in the 1905 Revolution as vice-chairman of the first St. Petersburg Soviet. 
After the defeat of the 1905 Revolution, Trotsky escaped abroad where he continued his 
socialist agitation working as a journalist and scholar. As a journalist covering the 
Balkans Wars of 1912-13 Trotsky, “delved into problems of supply, military training, and 
tactics, and revealed the atrocities and primitive cruelty of the war.”8 His journalistic 
observations of World War I in France showed a similar concern for both technical and 
human aspects of military affairs. In 1917 first-hand experience of warfare was rare 
among leading Bolsheviks: they generally had only superficial experience of army life 
and fighting techniques. During the October Revolution of 1917 Trotsky directed much 
of the power seizure in the Russian capital while serving as chairman of the Bolshevik-
majority Petrograd Soviet.  
Many leading Bolsheviks resented Trotsky’s appointment as head of the Red 
Army. For over a decade prior to 1917 (when he finally joined the Bolsheviks), Trotsky 
had affiliated himself with the Menshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic 
Party. During the Menshevik-Bolshevik dispute, Trotsky had directed bitterly personal 
attacks at the Bolsheviks’ leader, Vladimir Ilich Lenin. Consequently, some Bolsheviks 
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perceived Trotsky’s appointment as a grave ideological threat to the party’s orthodox 
position on matters of military policy and national security. Outgoing Bolshevik military 
leaders such as Nikolai Podvoisky and Nikolai Krylenko had been committed to 
demobilization of the old Imperial forces and to the abolition of the standing army. In 
general, they opposed the “reactionary” military policies of the Provisional Government 
and the tsar.  
Before Trotsky could begin to formulate his own policies for the army, he would 
have to come to terms with the revolutionary military policies of his predecessors. As he 
did so, he confronted growing threats from the anti-Bolshevik Volunteer Army in the 
south; organized rebellion in Siberia, the Urals, and on the Volga; hunger and unrest in 
Russia’s cities; national secession movements on Russia’s periphery; and foreign 
intervention against the Bolshevik government. In this chapter I will analyze the situation 
Trotsky inherited in March of 1918, the military threats of early 1918, the Bolshevik 
ideological framework for dealing with military problems, and Trotsky’s initial efforts to 
build the Red Army.  
The situation facing Trotsky in March 1918 was grim. By then Bolsheviks’ initial 
optimism had faded. The Bolshevik’s seizure of power in Petrograd in October 1917 was 
a relatively bloodless coup. Days after taking power, the Bolsheviks had defended their 
new government from an assault by counter-revolutionary soldiers on the outskirts of 
Petrograd. This “battle” turned out to be little more than an unorganized skirmish. In it 
the Bolsheviks relied on workers’ militias popularly known as “Red Guards” and on a 
handful of sympathetic soldiers and sailors. Pitched battles similar to the Petrograd 
skirmish were fought in Moscow and in several provincial cities during the weeks 
17 
 
following the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power. Less than a month after the successful 
Revolution of November 7, the Bolsheviks (or local soviets nominally aligned with them) 
held power in the most important population centers of central Russia. 
Many Bolsheviks expected the initial skirmishing to be the height of the party’s 
involvement in waging conventional warfare. Many Bolsheviks (including Trotsky 
himself) assumed that the October Revolution would touch off a global upheaval that 
would establish a new, proletarian world order. In December of 1917 Josef Stalin and 
Vladimir Lenin jointly proclaimed, “the Peoples of Europe, exhausted by the War, are 
already stretching out their hands to us and creating peace. The workers and soldiers of 
the West are already gathering under the banner of socialism.”9 The more dogmatic Party 
faithful pronounced that Imperial Germany would soon halt its attacks on the Soviet 
Republic because its workers would soon seize power. As some party members predicted 
peace, more realistic Bolsheviks prepared for war.  
At this stage, few Bolsheviks concerned about defending socialism advocated the 
creation of a regular army. Because popular militias had been sufficient for the seizure of 
power, many Bolsheviks assumed these same forces would prove adequate to preserve 
Soviet power. Therefore, the Bolsheviks’ first steps to establish a regular defense called 
for expanding local Red Guards forces into a nation-wide socialist militia. For this 
purpose the Soviet government proclaimed, “the arming of the workers… and the 
complete disarmament of the propertied classes are decreed in order to assure all power 
for the workers.”10 Workers (and not peasants) were at this time encouraged to organize 
local militias that would be placed under the control of the local soviets. Through the 
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hierarchy of the soviets these individual workers’ brigades would theoretically be 
accountable to the Military Organization of the Bolsheviks’ Central Committee. In 
reality, the Bolsheviks failed to work out an effective manner of coordinating these 
militias. 
In the first months of Soviet power the Bolsheviks’ most effective shock-troops 
were those units of the Imperial Army that subordinated themselves to the new Soviet 
power. Three brigades of Latvian riflemen (totaling 35,000 men) accepted the 
Bolsheviks’ promises of working-class power, an equitable distribution of agricultural 
land, and an end to Russian involvement in the First World War. In 1918 the Soviet 
government relied heavily on the Latvians to suppress local rebellions and maintain their 
control over disputed territories. The historian Richard Pipes has observed: “The Latvians 
rendered the Bolsheviks invaluable services: dispersing the Constituent Assembly, 
putting down the Left SR uprising, defending the Volga from the Czechs, and guarding 
their persons from potential assassins.”11 Yet the Latvians were far too few in number to 
defend the Soviet Republic alone. By March 1918 it was clear the Bolsheviks would have 
to dramatically expand their combat-ready armed forces. 
Three years of the most brutal fighting in Russia’s history had taken their toll on 
the peasant conscripts who made up the vast bulk of the nation’s fighting troops. As Mark 
von Hagen noted in his study of the Red Army, “the soldiers understood the 
[Bolsheviks’] peace proclamations [of October 1917] to be the first step towards the 
general demobilization they had been awaiting… thousands of soldiers simply departed 
                                                          
11
 Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), p. 27 
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for home, many to take part in the redistribution of lands in the countryside.”12 Within the 
first months of Bolshevik power the pace of mass desertion was accelerated when the 
new Soviet government banned corporal punishment in the military, outlawed military 
disciplinary courts, and abolished military ranks. The party encouraged soldiers to form 
their own democratic committees and to elect their own officers. When these soldiers 
abandoned their posts, officers could do nothing to prevent them. The Soviet government 
had done away with the officer corps’s disciplinary powers.  
The administrative structures the new government put in place to command the 
military were ineffective. Upon taking power, the Bolsheviks created two organs directly 
responsible for military policy. The Military-Naval Committee of the Second Congress of 
the Soviets was responsible for setting military policies. The People’s Commissariat for 
Military Affairs (also known as Narkomvoena, later renamed the People’s Commissariat 
for Army and Navy Affairs after Trotsky took over) was responsible for the day-to-day 
control of those military forces that still answered to the authority of the Bolshevik Party. 
These groups included the Red Guards and the remnants of the Imperial Army’s General 
Staff. In practice, the authority of the Military Committee and Narkomvoena often over-
lapped. Local soviets also interfered in military policy-making. The competition between 
bureaucratic organs with shared responsibilities would characterize Soviet governance at 
all levels for much of its early history; military affairs were especially impaired by this 
trend. 
In December 1917 an All-Army Conference on Demobilization was called by the 
Bolsheviks’ military authorities. In spite of the conference’s mandate to establish a 
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 Mark Von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship: the Red Army and the Soviet Socialist State, 
1917-1930, (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1990), p. 17 
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demobilization policy, demobilization proceeded haphazardly, outside the government’s 
control. Therefore the conference concentrated more on creating a new army and on 
saving what was left of the old one. On 30 December, the conference passed a resolution 
endorsing the creation of “a New, Socialist Army” to be formed exclusively of working-
class volunteers with ‘revolutionary credentials’ from Russia’s urban areas.13 What 
remained of the old General Staff were dismissed when they proposed building the new 
army from a core of 1,300,000 soldiers still serving on the fronts. While rejecting their 
proposals, the Bolsheviks ordered the General Staff to assist the government in 
maintaining order at the fronts until new, “socialist” divisions could be formed in the 
rear. In practice this proved impossible; Soviet decrees on everything from land policy to 
discipline in the Army had made the collapse of the old military formations inevitable. 
Before it dispersed, the conference created an organization that would eventually 
be known as “the All-Russian Collegiate for the Formation of the Red Army.” The 
Collegiate founded the Red Army on 28 January 1918. It set out to organize the new 
army in the rear based on democratic, volunteerist principles; officers would be elected 
and non-working class recruits were to be dismissed. Thanks to the combination of 
societal chaos and flimsy administrative capacity on the part of the Collegiate, the Red 
Army existed only on paper at the time of Trotsky’s appointment as army commissar. 
Nominally, the Red Army commanded hundreds of thousands of troops at its birth, but 
this was a gross exaggeration of its true strength. As the military scholar John Erickson 
observed of the Red Army at that point in time, “the number of men was no real index--- 
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what counted was trained manpower, and the Soviet regime could command perhaps 
50,000 trained men.”14 
On 18 February 1918 the Germans broke the armistice with Soviet Russia. It did 
not take long for them to make deep inroads into Russian territory. With a few 
exceptions, the Russian soldiers still at their posts retreated without fighting. As the 
Germans advanced unimpeded, the Bolsheviks rushed loyal Red Guards to the battlefield 
in an attempt to stabilize the front. The Red Guards were decisively defeated while 
inflicting minimal casualties on the Germans. Von Hagen has noted, “the Red Army, for 
all their political attractiveness and their success in skirmishes against domestic 
opponents, proved incapable of resisting a modern mass army. The Germans advanced 
virtually unimpeded.”15 The immediate result of the Bolsheviks’ pathetic military 
performance was the humiliating treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Bolsheviks were forced to 
renounce all claims on Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Finland. 
Much of this territory had been considered to be an integral part of the larger Russian 
polity. Russians on both the left and right were appalled at the harsh terms of peace; 
many held the Bolsheviks to be solely responsible for this humiliation.  
Brest-Litovsk led the Bolsheviks to realize that they would have to dramatically 
increase their military capacities, regardless of whether or not the methods used accorded 
with revolutionary ideology. At the same, time the treaty dramatically undermined 
popular support for the regime. Lack of popular support heightened the urgency of 
solving the military question in the eyes of party leaders. Unfortunately for the 
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Bolsheviks, the German victory also reduced the Bolsheviks’ ability to field a combat-
ready army. The historian Nicholas Riasanovsky observed of Brest-Litovsk’s results: 
“Russia lost 26 percent of her total population, 27 percent of her arable land; 32 percent 
of her average crops; 26 percent of her railway system; 33 percent of her manufacturing 
industries; 73 percent of her iron industries; 75 percent of her coal fields.”16 At this bleak 
moment, Trotsky assumed the position of People’s Commissar for Army and Navy 
Affairs. His decision to reform the Red Army would be conditioned both by the events 
preceding his appointment, as well as the numerous threats the Soviet Republic 
confronted in the wake of the Brest treaty. 
The most serious military threat confronting the Bolsheviks in March 1918 was 
the White Volunteer Army (Dobrovolcheskaya Armiya) operating in the Kuban. The 
Volunteer Army was a small force, but its perceived effectiveness made it a grave threat 
in the eyes of the Bolsheviks. Its formation started with the flight of General Mikhail 
Alekseev from Moscow to the lands of the Don Cossacks after the October Revolution. 
Alekseev was a distinguished general who had coordinated the Russian armed forces 
from 1915 until the Bolshevik seizure of power. He was appalled by the Bolsheviks’ 
willingness to abandon the fight against Imperial Germany. Many scholars have argued 
that the original White volunteers were motivated as much by their desire to honor 
Russia’s commitments in the First World War and to prevent social chaos, as they were 
by the desire to overthrow socialism and to restore conservative power.  Pipes spoke for 
this school when he attributed the beginning of the Civil War to “a small band of patriotic 
officers, humiliated by the destruction of the Russian Army and the Bolshevik 
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government’s betrayal of commitments to the Allies, who decided to continue the war 
against the Central Powers.”17  
The Volunteers’ struggle to preserve the Russian war effort began in the lands of 
the Don Cossacks, hundreds of miles from both German armies and Bolshevik power. 
This isolation promised Alekseev a relative safe-haven where he could grow his 
miniscule forces. At the beginning of March 1918 the Volunteers had fewer than 3,000 
soldiers bearing arms. They were drawn almost exclusively from the old Imperial officer 
corps, because rank-and-file soldiers were generally unwilling to serve in a force so 
heavily composed of officers whom they perceived as symbols of tsarist oppression. 
Recruiting increased pace when Alekseev was joined by General Lavr Kornilov at the 
end of 1917. Kornilov, famous for his purported coup attempt against the Provisional 
Government in August 1917, was charismatic but brash and impetuous. Alekseev and 
Kornilov quickly butted heads when Kornilov attempted to take command of the recruits 
Alekseev had organized. A deal was brokered giving Alekseev control of the army’s 
finances and political relations, while Kornilov was given sole command of military 
operations. At this point the Volunteer Army numbered around 4,000 troops, not 
including its unreliable Don Cossack allies. 
The appearance of the Volunteer Army did not catch the Bolsheviks off guard. By 
January the Bolsheviks had dispatched a force of 7,000 men armed with tsarist weapons 
to the Don to combat the ill-supplied Whites. Hunger was threatening the Bolshevik-
controlled cities in Central Russia, and the Party was determined to regain control of this 
important grain-producing region at all costs. Fortunately for the Bolsheviks, the Don 
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Cossacks failed to support their White allies. Many younger Cossacks who had served in 
the Great War disliked serving alongside former tsarist officers, and some disobeyed their 
elders’ orders to aid the Volunteers. After the pro-White ataman Alexis Kaledin 
committed suicide in February, the Don Cossacks temporarily abandoned the Volunteers; 
without Cossack support the Volunteers were no match for the more numerous 
Bolsheviks. To avoid complete annihilation at the hands of the Reds, General Kornilov 
led his troops on a brutal retreat through enemy territory to the anti-Bolshevik stronghold 
of the Kuban Cossacks. The retreat is popularly referred to as “the Ice March.” Pipes 
extolled the Volunteers’ heroism: “The small band of Volunteers traversed hostile 
territory, harassed by inogorodnye [landless peasants originally from outside the Don 
region] and pro-Bolshevik deserters, braving savage cold and freezing rain, short of food, 
clothing, and weapons.”18 One out of four White soldiers died on the march, including 
General Kornilov. Fortunately for the Whites, the Red offensive had dissipated by April. 
After Kornilov’s death the capable General Denikin took command of the Volunteers as 
they began to recover their strength in the relative safety of the Kuban. Despite the 
Volunteers’ retreat, the Bolsheviks still considered the threat of armed opposition very 
real. 
 Equally threatening to Bolshevik security was urban hunger. Harsh measures the 
Bolsheviks took to combat the food shortage increased security risks. By October 1917 
the Russian economy had been on the verge of collapse, with industries producing at a 
fraction of their pre-war levels and the transportation system in collapse. The trains still 
running were sometimes commandeered by deserters or bandits. Grain rotted on rail 
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sidings for lack of working locomotives to haul it. Russia’s vast internal distances, harsh 
weather, and poor road infrastructure made it difficult to ship grain by other means. By 
late 1917 the Russian currency was virtually worthless. Together, the imploding currency 
and declining supply of badly-needed industrial goods led many peasants to hoard their 
grain. 
The results of this dilemma were predictable. W. Bruce Lincoln makes clear how 
bad the situation was by the beginning of 1918: “Although experts estimated that a 
laborer required an absolute minimum of 2,700 calories to survive, a Petrograder’s daily 
rations supplied 1,395 calories.”19 As food deliveries to the cities became more 
infrequent, hunger worsened. Tens of thousands of civilians living in Bolshevik-
controlled urban areas starved to death during the winter of 1917/1918. Even supporters 
of the October Revolution turned against Bolshevik power when they could no longer 
find food to feed their families. Growing discontent manifested itself in the increasing 
frequency of strikes, food riots, and even armed protests against the Soviet regime. The 
significance of this restive behavior was not lost on Party leaders; it all seemed eerily 
reminiscent of the disturbances that had helped bring down the tsar in February 1917. 
Despite the combination of impassioned appeals for calm and harsh police measures to 
combat unrest, the situation failed to improve. 
Hungry city-dwellers fled their residences in droves to return to their old villages, 
where they hoped to have greater access to food supplies. Lincoln described the exodus 
from Petrograd as so vast that “seven out of every ten men and women who had lived 
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there in 1917 no longer remained in the summer of 1920.”20 The depletion of the urban 
workforce led to a further decline in industrial output. Few laborers remained at their 
work-stations; those who did were often too weak from starvation to be productive. The 
combination of hunger and mass urban emigration threatened the Bolsheviks sway over 
the lynchpin of Soviet power, the proletariat. A “socialist” army could not be constructed 
when the workers it sought to mobilize had either fled the cities or were joining the 
opposition. 
If starvation in Russia’s cities undermined Bolshevik power, the measures taken 
in the countryside to combat the hunger only made things worse. In the aftermath of the 
October Revolution, many peasants tepidly supported the Bolsheviks, mainly out of 
gratitude for the party’s decree on land. But peasants expected the new socialist regime to 
leave them to work the land in peace with minimal government intrusion. Russia’s 
peasants were in for a rude awakening. At first the party attempted to convince the 
peasantry voluntarily to part with their grain. Agents of the Soviet Republic were 
dispatched to the villages to barter industrial goods for grain. By late 1917, however the 
cities had run out of goods to barter; the worthless currency proved equally ineffective in 
convincing the peasants to part with their grain. 
Lenin and other hardliners in the party argued the time had come for drastic 
measures. Armed detachments of Bolshevik supporters--- the so-called ‘food brigades’--- 
were dispatched from the cities to seize “hoarded” grain at gunpoint. With typical zeal 
Lenin proclaimed: “We did not hesitate to wrest the land away from the landlords, to 
transfer the factories, mills, and railroads into the hands of the people… and by force of 
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arms, to tear the crown from the stupid tsar’s head. Why then should we hesitate to take 
the grain away from the kulaks?”21 As part of the new coercive policy, the Bolsheviks 
established a Dictatorship of Food Supply on 9 May 1918. The new “Dictatorship” 
enlisted thousands more workers from Russia’s cities to participate in grain-
requisitioning. These armed workers wreaked havoc across the countryside of central 
Russia. It did not take long for the Russian peasants’ position of benevolent neutrality 
towards the Soviet regime to grow into opposition. 
To add insult to injury, the Bolsheviks attempted to introduce militant class 
struggle into villages. Although peasant communities were largely free from the stark 
income inequality of the cities, the Bolsheviks classified villagers as poor, middle, or rich 
peasants (kulaks). Food brigades treated poor peasants as supporters, but “kulaks” were 
subjected to discriminatory measures, or worse. Even when the poor peasants willingly 
embraced Bolshevik ideas of class conflict, the results were not always what the 
Bolsheviks intended. “Rich” peasants would comply with the Bolsheviks at gun-point, 
then retaliate against Bolshevik sympathizers after the food brigades had left. Bolshevik 
supporters were beaten, evicted from their homes, and decidedly ostracized. Many party 
sympathizers suffered violent deaths similar to those meted out by the Bolsheviks to 
“kulaks.” The Bolsheviks’ combination of violent agitation and armed extortion turned 
vast stretches of the countryside into enemy territory. After 1918, the Bolsheviks could 
not rely on the peasantry for food or to send willing conscripts to the new Soviet army. 
For the remainder of the Civil War the Bolsheviks would enter rural areas at their own 
risk. 
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The most serious internal threat to Soviet power erupted in May 1918 with the 
revolt of the 60,000-strong Czechoslovak Legion. The Czechoslovak Legion was one of 
several groups of national minorities mobilized to fight against the Austro-German 
alliance during World War I. The soldiers of the Legion wanted to win independence 
from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Not surprisingly, tensions erupted between the new 
Soviet government and the Czechoslovaks in the wake of the Brest-Litovsk treaty. With 
the assistance of Entente diplomats, a deal was brokered whereby the Bolsheviks agreed 
to transport the Legion to Vladivostok via the Trans-Siberian Railway. From there the 
legionnaires would be transported by allied ships back to Europe, where they would fight 
against the Austro-Germans on the fields of France. Unfortunately for both sides, the 
evacuation stalled as the performance of Russia’s rail network rapidly deteriorated. The 
Legion grew increasingly impatient with their Bolshevik hosts. When Trotsky ordered 
contingents of the Legion to surrender their weapons in May 1918, the Czechoslovaks 
rose up in open revolt. 
At this point the Legion was scattered across Western Siberia and throughout the 
Volga region. The first objective of the wayward legionnaires was to unite their forces so 
they could fight their way across Siberia. Eventually they hoped to make their way to 
Vladivostok where they would be evacuated. During summer 1918 the Legion seized 
cities across the Volga region and Siberia. Samara, Ufa, Saratov, and Simbirsk all fell 
rapidly to them. By early August 1918 much of the Volga, the Urals, and a good part of 
Siberia were occupied by the Legion. Opposition governments sprang up in the areas that 
had been cleared of Bolsheviks. In Samara a coalition of Socialist-Revolutionaries (SRs) 
proclaimed a new government in the name of the disposed Constituent Assembly 
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popularly referred to as “Komuch.” Another coalition government of anti-Bolshevik 
forces was proclaimed at Omsk in Siberia. Though both of these governments were 
initially quite weak, they were protected from harassment by the Legion. If allowed to 
develop, these opposition governments would have become rival centers of political 
authority in Russia. On 7 August 1918 the Czechoslovak Legion (accompanied by less-
skilled Komuch soldiers) captured Kazan from Bolshevik forces. With just five hundred 
miles (and no effective military opposition) between Legion-occupied Kazan and the 
Bolshevik capital at Moscow, many believed the Soviet regime to be incredibly 
vulnerable. What few soldiers the Red Army could reliably muster were concentrated in 
the southern and western peripheries; no surplus forces were prepared to move east. If the 
Bolsheviks were to guarantee their weak grip on power, a larger, more effective fighting 
force would have to materialize quickly. Trotsky’s ability to rapidly mobilize a capable 
response to the unexpected threat from the East would stretch his abilities as an organizer 
to their limits. 
No threat was viewed with more apprehension by the Bolsheviks than the 
prospect of foreign intervention. Russia’s wartime allies had greeted the October 
Revolution with wary ambivalence. Any pretext of neutrality swiftly vanished in the 
wake of the Soviet-German peace. At the beginning of March small contingents of 
British marines had landed at the port of Murmansk to secure allied munitions intended 
for the war effort against Germany. By late April over 2,000 allied troops had landed at 
Murmansk. Relations between the Bolsheviks and the allies deteriorated rapidly. At the 
beginning of May 1918 the allied forces occupied Murmansk. The revolt of the 
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Czechoslovak Legion increased the allies’ desire to intervene on a more widespread 
scale. Britain began to deliver arms and supplies to anti-Bolshevik military forces.  
At the beginning of July another expeditionary force of five-thousand allied 
troops was dispatched to occupy the port of Archangelsk. These forces would secure the 
supply lines linking the allies to anti-Bolshevik militants. According to Lincoln, “by mid-
July, the allies had committed themselves to wage a full-fledged offensive in some of the 
roughest terrain and most inhospitable climate to be found anywhere in the Western 
world.”22 On July 6 President Wilson had overcome his initial misgivings surrounding 
armed intervention in Russia and agreed to send 7,000 troops secure arms shipments to 
the Legion through the Pacific port of Vladivostok. By August combined forces totaling 
in the thousand of allied troops were flowing into the now-occupied capital of Russia’s 
Far East. 
The allied troops would largely refrain from taking an active role in combat 
against the Bolsheviks’ forces. Still, few could have predicted this in the middle of 1918. 
Many of the Bolshevik leaders, including Lenin himself, openly expected the worst. 
Fearing intervention, Bolshevik leaders issued panicky demands for mass mobilization. 
At the height of the crisis, the Central Executive Committee called for the augmenting of 
Red forces with a million additional troops. It is highly unlikely that any number of 
troops that the Bolsheviks were capable of fielding in 1918 would have been able to resist 
a full-fledged allied assault, but the new sense of urgency still made an impression. The 
need to defend Soviet power against foreign intervention gave new impetus to the push 
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for a strong Red Army capable of simultaneously fielding millions of troops across 
multiple fronts. 
Before we can examine the interaction between Trotsky’s military pragmatism 
and Bolshevik ideology, we must first revisit the Bolshevik’s institutional framework for 
determining military policy. When Trotsky took over control of military affairs in March 
1918, there were two main bodies responsible for matters of defense: the Supreme 
Military Soviet (Verkhovnyi Voennyi Soviet) and ‘the All-Russia Collegiate for the 
Administration of the Worker-Peasant Red Army (All-Russia Collegiate). The VVS, 
formed immediately prior to Trotsky’s appointment, was largely composed of former 
Imperial officers. The All-Russia Collegiate had a heavier party contingent, and was 
therefore the preferred partner of those communists in the government who had not been 
specifically assigned to deal with military affairs. The two bodies had overlapping areas 
of responsibility. While both were subordinate to the party, there was no clear delineation 
of their authority. Erickson has observed “the creation of the VVS… ushered in what 
Soviet historians call the period of ‘parallelism’ in the early history of the Red Army: two 
concepts of an army, two sources of command, and two images of ‘the enemy’.”23 As 
Army Commissar, Trotsky was in charge of both bodies, but one man could not prevent 
competition between the two organizations. In the end the only thing guaranteeing a 
semblance of coherency to Bolshevik military policy was the dominance of Trotsky. He 
answered to the party for his decisions, but in between arty meetings he had a free-hand 
in building the Red Army. 
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This brings us back to the growing tension between previous party doctrine on 
matters of defense, and Trotsky’s pragmatic approach to building the Red Army. As 
revolutionary socialists, the Bolsheviks respected the judgments of Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels on matters of ideology, yet Marx and Engels had written very little on 
military policy. They had considered armies in the context of their analysis of the state. 
According to the Marxist canon, all states are repressive bodies with organized 
contingents of armed men responsible for maintaining the rule of an oppressor class over 
the oppressed. In practice these armed contingents are what we would refer to as the army 
and police. According to Engels: “Public power exists in every state; it consists not 
merely of armed people but also of material adjuncts, prisons and institutions of coercion 
of all kinds.”24 Similar descriptions encouraged the Bolsheviks to think of armies 
primarily as a means of maintaining the class divisions of bourgeois society. Not 
surprisingly, many Bolsheviks assumed that, according to Marx, there would be no need 
for an army under socialism. These assumptions led the more dogmatic Bolsheviks 
vociferously to reject a standing army in the new socialist state. 
Trotsky refrained from challenging Marx’s and Engels’views of military affairs. 
Indeed he embraced it. According to Trotsky, the nascent Soviet Republic was the 
embodiment of proletarian-class rule. While the socialist state would eventually give way 
to the classless society of communism, at the present moment it would be suicidal to 
dispense with the standing-armies. Far from threatening the revolutionary character of the 
Soviet state, a standing army would secure proletarian power in Bolshevik Russia. As 
Trotsky put it, “the army being formed will conform to the nature of the classes which 
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now hold power; this army will not become a fresh factor of disorganization and 
disintegration, but will be the fighting organ of these new ruling classes.”25 
Most Bolsheviks agreed with Trotsky that some form of military organization was 
necessary, but they disagreed about the shape the army would take. “Orthodox” 
Bolsheviks thought the Red Army should rely on volunteers; conscription was a detested 
relic of the tsarist past that no socialist power could seriously adopt in good faith. Early in 
1918, Podvoisky and Krylenko proclaimed that instead of an army based on forced 
conscription, the Red Army should consist of volunteers. Erickson detailed the initial 
plans: “The ‘new’ army made up of soldier-volunteers would comprise 144 infantry 
regiments (36 divisions, each of 10,000 men)… a ‘Socialist army’ built ‘on elective 
principles, on the principles of mutual comradely respect and discipline.’”26 
Unfortunately for the Bolsheviks, few seemed interested in volunteering to serve the 
Soviet Republic in battle after four years of continuous and bloody fighting. Erickson 
noted that by February 1918, “volunteerism had virtually failed. Of the 30,000 Red 
Guards, 10,000 were in a condition of ‘military readiness’ though latterly discipline and 
order had broken down at a sharp rate.”27 
Trotsky understood clearly the failure of the volunteer army. Less than a month 
after becoming army commissar, Trotsky laid the groundwork for an army built on the 
principles of universal military conscription. On 22 April 1918 he paid lip-service to the 
principles of “universal disarmament, permanent peace, and fraternal cooperation 
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between all peoples inhabiting the earth.”28 The real subject of his talk was mandatory 
military service. “The Workers’ and Peasants’ Government of the Republic deems it its 
immediate task to enroll all citizens for compulsory labor and military service… Military 
training is compulsory for male citizens of the Russian Soviet Federative Republic.”29 
Trotsky knew that whatever disadvantages the Bolsheviks may have had in military 
expertise when compared to the Volunteer Army, the Soviet regime still had an 
overwhelming superiority in manpower. The trick was to find a way to exploit this 
untapped resource; volunteerism had failed but conscription was still untested. Any 
doubts the party may have had concerning Trotsky’s recruitment policies largely 
vanished in the wake of the Czechoslovaks’ revolt. On 29 May 1918 the Central 
Executive Committee of the Soviets issued a decree requiring mandatory military service 
for working-class males under 40. By the end of August, over 540,000 men had been 
pressed into service with the Red Army. 
The Executive Committee’s decree exposed a point of growing concern for many 
Bolsheviks: the class character of the new Red Army. Trotsky himself had justified the 
standing army by emphasizing its proletarian character; party hardliners were anxious to 
prevent other classes from bearing arms in the socialist state. During the volunteer period 
prior to Trotsky’s appointment, eligibility for military service had been strictly limited to 
members of the working-class. Bolshevik exclusivity stemmed from more than 
puritanical impulses to maintain “class purity.” Marxist ideology interpreted the army and 
police as repressive agencies whose purpose was to maintain the hegemony of the ruling 
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class. If the classes manning these agencies had aims contradicting those of the ruling 
class, they were no longer perceived as reliable. Therefore many Bolsheviks regarded the 
inclusion of other classes into the Red Army and the police as threats to the working-
class. Trotsky himself did not dispute the desirability of having a fighting force made up 
exclusively of the proletariat. 
Yet the number of workers even capable of serving in the armed forces fell far 
short of the total required to provide for socialism’s effective defense. Trotsky knew the 
extra troops would have to come from somewhere; the question was where. Recruitment 
(i.e. conscription) targeted people from working-class backgrounds but also “poor” 
peasants. If these peasants had provided armed assistance to grain-requisitioning 
detachments in the villages, why couldn’t they serve the Soviets on the field of battle? 
Still, class origin was a serious matter for leading Bolsheviks, so Trotsky was careful not 
to move too quickly. Initial mobilizations still relied primarily on the working-class. Not 
until late summer 1918 did the army begin to call up peasants in sizeable numbers. In the 
meantime, Trotsky referred repeatedly to the worker-and-peasant-based nature of Soviet 
power. The village poor were depicted as rural workers. In May Trotsky asked his 
listeners: “Can we doubt, comrades, that the fraternal alliance between the town workers 
and the village poor will be strengthened?”30 In forming the Red Army, Trotsky gambled 
on the assumption that the answer to his question would be a resounding no. 
More controversial than the inclusion of peasants in the Red Army was the use of 
“military specialists” or former Tsarist officers. In the wake of the October Revolution, 
military officers were reviled as symbols of tsarist reaction. Workers were encouraged to 
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elect their own officers and to dismiss commanders who were not receptive the new 
forms of democratic military organization. As late as February 1918, Bolshevik leaders 
were more concerned with getting rid of the old officer corps than putting them to work. 
Party militants pointed to the examples of the abortive Kornilov putsch in 1917 and to the 
nascent Volunteer Army as evidence that veteran officers were politically unreliable; 
these officers were direct threats to the gains of the Revolution. Members of the old 
General Staff who had remained at their posts were ignored, even as German forces 
threatened to overrun Petrograd. To ensure that officers could no longer “tyrannize” the 
rank-and-file soldier within the first months of Bolshevik power, disciplinary measures 
such as corporal punishment were effectively banned. Recognizing the need for trained 
specialists to lead the new volunteer-based Red Army, party stalwarts called for the 
training of new officers from proper class backgrounds. To fulfill this growing need, 
special military schools were established to educate men with the proper class 
backgrounds in the art of leading men on the battlefield. 
Trotsky recognized the necessity of utilizing the old officer corps. None of 
Trotsky’s military policies attracted more fervent opposition within the party than his 
advocacy of employing former officers as “military-specialists.” Trotsky began 
campaigning for the inclusion of military-specialists in the new Red Army immediately 
following his appointment to Commissar for Army and Navy Affairs. On 21 March 1918 
he proclaimed, “before long every worker and peasant would undergoe military training 
and officers and non-commissioned officers of the old command corps’ would be made 
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use of.”31 To prepare the way for a more conventional military order in which the old 
officers would feel comfortable, Trotsky reversed Soviet policies on military discipline. 
Within weeks of his appointment, he had ordered elected soldiers’ committees to disband, 
and he had revoked their right to appoint officers. Commanders’ abilities to punish their 
soldiers were restored, as was corporal punishment and even the death penalty for serious 
disciplinary offenses. Special “revolutionary military tribunals” were also established to 
ensure soldiers actively complied with the harsh new policies. 
Many within the party were appalled by Trotsky’s swift change of course on 
military affairs. Despite Lenin’s support and the backing of the Central Executive 
Committee, and even the Council of People’s Commissars, Trotsky had to placate 
opponents of his policy. To assuage growing concerns surrounding party control of the 
nascent Red Army, he expanded the jurisdiction of the political commissars. Two 
political commissars would operate in each unit down to the company level, overseeing 
the conduct of all military-specialists. For a military order to be valid, it would have to 
have the signature of both the commanding officer and a political commissar. In practice, 
this created a regime of dual-control or dvoenachalie in Red Army units where two 
separate sources of authority would have to agree before operations could be carried out. 
Whatever deleterious effects this may have had on operational capacities, it was probably 
the only way to appease the party rank-and-file’s growing discontent with Trotsky’s 
military policy. According to Von Hagen, “by reforming and expanding the institution of 
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the political commissar… Sovnarkom recognized revolutionaries’ demands that mass 
organizations keep tight control over the military apparatus.”32 
Late in summer 1918, the scene was set for what Richard Pipes has called, “the 
most devastating event in that country’s history since the Mongol invasions in the 
thirteenth century.”33 Trotsky had ascended to the command of the Red Army in the wake 
of a humiliating peace treaty with Germany; he had few effective forces under his 
control. To make matters worse, he faced foreign and domestic threats that would have 
put even the most experienced commanders to the test. He rose to the challenge by 
balancing party orthodoxy against the exigencies of civil war. 1918 saw numerous threats 
to Trotsky’s military formulae, 1919 would be no different.  
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Ch. Two--- Trotsky and the Red Army, Late 1918 to November 1919 
 
“Before the gates of Kazan stand the workers’ and peasants’ regiments of the Red Army. 
They know what their task is: to prevent the enemy from taking a single step forward; to 
wrest Kazan from his grasp; to throw back the Czech mercenaries and the officer thugs, 
drown them in the Volga, and crush their criminal mutiny against the workers’ 
revolution.”- Trotsky August 191834 
 
  
On 8 August 1918 Trotsky’s armored train halted at the Sviiazshk railway station. 
Fifteen miles away lay Kazan, the strategic gateway to the Volga that had fallen to a 
combined force of Czechoslovaks and soldiers of the Komuch government the day 
before. Trotsky arrived to take charge of the Red Army forces in the wake of the Soviets’ 
most important military defeat to date. Following the Czechoslovak revolt in May 1918, 
it was assumed by some leading Bolsheviks that the Czechoslovaks would fight their way 
east towards the port of Vladivostok; many legionnaires were already east of the Urals. 
Subsequent battles in the Volga region had undermined their assumption. By 8 August, 
most of the Volga region had been lost to the Czechoslovaks and Komuch. The Red 
Army’s defeat might shake Bolshevik power further westwards. By rail the Bolshevik 
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capital at Moscow was just a few days from the front. The Czechoslovak Legion was 
more potent than existing Bolshevik forces. If more of the legionnaires joined their 
comrades on the Volga, the threat to Moscow would be grave. 
 The presence in Kazan of Komuch forces, known as the People’s Army 
(Narodnaia Armiya), further jeopardized matters. Under the command of the capable 
V.O. Kappel, contingents of the People’s Army had played a key role at Kazan. The 
Komuch government at Samara was led by Socialist-Revolutionaries believed to have 
close ties to the Volga peasantry. Komuch flew the red flag and advocated a radical 
program of land redistribution and social justice while renouncing the Bolshevik 
dictatorship. The historian Evan Mawdsley noted: “Unlike the counter-revolutionaries of 
1919 and 1920, who were mostly army officers of conservative or reactionary views, 
Komuch claimed to oppose the Bolshevik government in the name of the people.”35 The 
alternative of radicalism without repression threatened key elements of Bolshevik 
support. 
 Fortunately for Trotsky, the Bolsheviks enjoyed a number of advantages. At the 
beginning of August 1918, the Red Army had shifted four separate army groups to the 
Eastern Front (First Army, Third Army, Fourth Army, and Fifth Army). Despite the Red 
Army’s presence, their June attempt to conscript the peasants of the Volga had failed. 
Still, the organizational structure of the new army groups provided the Bolsheviks with a 
crucial advantage. Reliable soldiers were swiftly diverted to the eastern army groups 
from other regions. Czechoslovak-Komuch forces struggled to field fully equipped units 
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across a broad front from Kazan to Samara. While their enemies struggled, the 
Bolsheviks prepared to field four separate groups to strike at their foes’ exposed front.  
At Kazan Trotsky benefitted from the presence of two of the Bolsheviks’ most 
capable commanders: Ioakim Vatsetis and Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Vatsetis was a rare 
find; he was both a gifted colonel with combat experience and the son of a worker. His 
leadership during the earlier defense of Kazan transformed what should have been an 
easy White victory into a bloody two-day engagement. Tukhachevksy was only twenty-
five years old, but was a brilliant military tactician who had quickly proved his worth as 
commander of the First Army on the Volga. Trotsky had a weak grasp of tactics but 
could rely on these men for assistance. What Trotsky could not contribute tactically, he 
made up for with his ability to alternately inspire and discipline the troops. For the troops 
of the Fifth Army, nothing was more inspiring than the provisions Trotsky delivered 
straight to the front. For weeks Red Army soldiers had fought in difficult conditions and 
had endured shortages of food and ammunition. Trotsky’s train was filled with all manner 
of goods that restored the troops’ spirits. As Lincoln observed: “Trotsky produced boots 
for the barefooted, tobacco, medicines, watches, food, even field glasses and machine 
guns, to raise the morale of Red Army fighting men at critical points along the front.”36 
Trotsky’s willingness to put himself in the line of fire while he delivered supplies further 
impressed the men on the line. Many Red Army soldiers had never seen a high-ranking 
member of the Bolshevik government.  
Of greater import was the transfer during the month of August of 30,000 fresh 
troops to the Volga front. Earlier Trotsky had sided with the head of the Bolsheviks’ 
                                                          
36Lincoln, Red Victory, p. 188 
42 
 
General Staff, General Bonch-Bruevich, by recommending that these reinforcements 
remain stationed on the western periphery to guard against a possible German attack. 
Lenin’s intervention secured the troops’ redeployment eastwards. Many of the fresh 
troops were active Bolsheviks or radical sympathizers recruited from the industrial areas 
of central Russia. These men had volunteered for Red Army duty during early 1918. 
Trotsky directed a torrent of revolutionary propaganda at the sympathetic soldiers which 
may have helped to boost morale. On board Trotsky’s armored train was a printing press 
he used to publish daily broadsides and rally the Bolshevik faithful. Trotsky wrote of his 
propaganda efforts at Kazan: “In this conflict we are using not only rifles, cannon, and 
machine guns, but also newspapers. For the newspaper is also a weapon. The newspaper 
binds together all units of the Fifth Army in one thought, one aspiration, one will.”37 
Trotsky also made frequent use of the gun and the lash. By the time he had 
arrived at the front, army discipline had collapsed. During the retreat from Kazan several 
units of the Fifth Army had defected en masse to the Czechoslovak-Komuch forces. Even 
part of Colonel Vatsetis’ headquarters staff had switched sides; Vatsetis barely escaped 
the city with his life. Trotsky set about restoring discipline. He accosted units that had 
ceased to maintain battle discipline. He organized fresh reinforcements for the weak 
Volga Naval Flotilla, allowing the Bolsheviks to regain naval supremacy. When men 
from the flotilla invited women on board and could not clearly identify who was in 
charge, Trotsky berated them: “Comrade sailors! This state of affairs is intolerable… 
When there is no proper order at the center there can be no solid, vigorous work done on 
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the vessels, either. And we are waging a serious struggle, a great struggle, truly a fight to 
the death.”38 
Trotsky’s attempts to restore discipline included violent reprisals. On 28 August 
1918 the Komuch commander Kappel launched a surprise attack against Trotsky’s 
encampment at Sviiazshk. The fighting occurred in the immediate vicinity of Trotsky’s 
train. During the course of the battle, a Fifth Army detachment panicked and fled from 
combat. Trotsky was saved when the Komuch troops were beaten back; Kazan was now 
open to a Red Army counterattack. Even in victory, Trotsky did not forget about the Red 
Army troops who had retreated without orders. After the battle was over, he issued death 
sentences for the unit’s commanders, and resorted to the practice of decimation for the 
men in the ranks: every tenth enlisted man was shot as a traitor to discourage future 
indiscipline. Pipes wrote of the incident: “The first known instance of mass execution of 
troops occurred on Trotsky’s orders and with Lenin’s approval at the end of August 1918 
on the Eastern front, when the principle of ‘decimation’ was applied and 20 men were 
shot, among them the regimental commander and commissar.”39 Trotsky publicized the 
incident to the whole of the Red Army. In this pronouncement he declared: “The fate of 
the working class is at stake. The brave and honorable soldier cannot give his life twice- 
for himself and for a deserter… Every honorable soldier and sailor will read the sentence 
of the court with complete satisfaction. No quarter must be given to traitors to the 
workers’ cause”40 
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The Red Army retook Kazan on 10 September 1918. Two days later, 
Tukhachevsky’s First Army retook the Volga city of Simbirsk. The Czechoslovak forces 
west of the Urals now retreated to the east. Without Czechoslovak assistance, the 
Komuch government offered only token resistance to the Red Army. On 7 October their 
capital at Samara fell to the Fourth Red Army. The fall of Komuch marked the end of the 
only serious democratic-socialist alternative to Bolshevik rule. Historians such as Evan 
Mawdsley have described the Kazan campaign as a turning point in the Russian Civil 
War. It helped Trotsky make the case for using regular officers to the rest of the party. He 
had witnessed former tsarist officers operating in a formal military structure decisively 
defeat the enemy. His support for more traditional forms of military organization was 
further bolstered. 
Trotsky spoke of a “breathing space” after the battles on the Volga. He expected a 
temporary lull in combat operations during the winter. He also hoped the victory at 
Kazan would silence his party critics who were displeased with his conduct as Army 
Commissar.  Trotsky was disappointed; over the winter of 1918-1919 security threats on 
the Southern and Eastern fronts appeared that were in many ways graver than past 
dangers. Similarly, over the winter dissension within the party over Trotsky’s Red Army 
policies coalesced before erupting at the 8th Party Congress in March 1919. 
Following the Czechoslovak Legion’s revolt early in the summer of 1918, the best 
Red Army troops and officers were shifted from the Southern and Western Fronts to the 
east. This permitted the battered Volunteer Army in the south of Russia to regroup and 
expand. Following the death of General Kornilov in April, General Anton Denikin rose to 
command the Volunteers. Denikin immediately asked Russia’s former wartime allies for 
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help that resulted in millions of tons worth of arms shipments in 1919. He also regrouped 
and rearmed those units that had survived Red Army offensives in spring 1918. By June, 
Denikin’s Volunteers had swollen to 9,000 men-at-arms; he decided to renew offensive 
operations. By July 1918 Denikin had driven the Bolsheviks from the lands of the Kuban 
Cossacks and threatened the Red Army’s routes to the Caucasus.  
As the Volunteer Army drove the Red Army from the north Caucasus, General 
Pyotr Krasnov (the new ataman of the Don Host) rallied his Cossacks to resume 
operations against the Bolsheviks. Krasnov relied on a massive influx of arms from the 
German Army’s occupation force in Ukraine. From summer to December 1918 his troops 
repeatedly threatened the strategically located city of Tsaritsyn on the southern Volga. 
Denikin attempted to unite his forces with the Don Cossacks, but Krasnov refused to 
subordinate his men to Denikin and publically endorsed the cause of independence for 
the Don Host. By January 1919 Krasnov’s final attempts to take Tsaritsyn had been 
defeated. The loss was a blessing in disguise for Denikin. Krasnov resigned in disgrace, 
leaving Denikin free to assume control over a unified force of Volunteers and Don 
Cossacks. By February 1919 the Bolsheviks faced a well-led, increasingly well-armed 
opposition on the Southern Front.  
As Denikin rebuilt the Volunteers in the south, Admiral Kolchak rallied his anti-
Bolshevik forces in Siberia. Following the Czechoslovak uprising in the summer of 1918, 
an anti-Bolshevik “Directorate” of moderate socialists and liberals established itself at 
Omsk. Former tsarist officials and officers who were uncomfortable with the Komuch 
government flocked to Omsk. The Directorate government proved ineffectual. Festering 
discontent with the Directorate resulted in a military coup on the night of 17-18 
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November 1918. It is unclear what role Kolchak played in the seizure of power, but the 
result was a military dictatorship with Kolchak as supreme ruler. Pipes recorded one 
popular interpretation of the events: “The Council of Ministers, which the Directory had 
appointed… claimed authority on its own behalf and immediately consigned it to 
Admiral Kolchak.”41 
In early December, Kolchak set out to build a military force capable of 
overthrowing the Communist regime. Many anti-Bolsheviks, both inside and outside of 
Russia, saw Kolchak as the best hope for removing the Bolsheviks from power. The 
British General Alfred Knox lobbied his government to support Kolchak. Kolchak was 
rewarded with money, arms, and even the presence of two British army battalions at his 
capital in Omsk. Pipes recorded the generous assistance: “Between October 1918 and 
October 1919, Britain sent to Omsk 97,000 tons of supplies, including 600,000 rifles, 6, 
831, machine guns, and over 200,000 uniforms.”42 With this help, by the end of the year 
Kolchak was able to field a (for the time) well-equipped fighting force of over 150,000 at 
combat strength. Trotsky and the Red Army were completely unprepared for such an 
unforeseen threat. Following their victory over the Komuch forces in October, the Red 
Army had overextended itself in a risky gambit to secure the Urals before the full onset of 
the Russian winter.  
In December 1918 Kolchak’s fresh troops surprised the exhausted left flank of the 
Bolsheviks’ Eastern Front Group. After October the High Command, including Trotsky, 
had seen the Eastern Front as less of a priority. Resources had been shifted to the 
Southern and Southwestern Fronts. It did not take long for Kolchak to expose this 
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mistake. The White counterattack forced the Third Army to retreat 190 miles from the 
Urals. By 25 December 1918 Kolchak’s forces had captured the important urban center at 
Perm.  
The winter’s temporary respite in fighting brought no relief to Trotsky politically. 
The Reds’ exultant triumphalism in October 1918 gave way to outrage and panic almost 
overnight. Five days after the defeat at Perm, the party’s most important organ in the 
region, the Ural obkom (Uralskyi Oblastnoi Komitet), released a report highly critical of 
the center’s (i.e. Trotsky’s) handling of military policy in the Urals. Mark Von Hagen 
noted that the report, “drew alarmed attention ‘to the predominance of mediocre old 
officers or outright White Guardists’ and demanded, “account for the bitter experience of 
the defeats suffered, and a radical reevaluation by the party on an all-Russian scale of the 
methods of building the Red Army.”43 Trotsky attempted to brush off the outcry: “The 
criticism expressed in the resolution from the Urals Regional Committee is abstract, 
fortuitous, and shapeless in character, and amounts--- if the Committee will pardon my 
saying so--- to a mild grumble.”44  
Many felt otherwise. The Bolshevik Central Committee took the accusations by 
the Urals obkom very seriously. A commission led by Josef Stalin and Feliks 
Dzerzhinsky was charged with investigating the obkom’s complaints. Neither man was a 
friend of Trotsky. Dzerzhinsky and Trotsky had clashed over the authority that 
Dzerzhinsky’s Cheka secret police could wield vis-à-vis the Red Army. Trotsky and 
Stalin were openly hostile towards each other. During summer 1918 Stalin had usurped 
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control over the defense of Tsaritsyn. Along with the communists-turned-Red Army men 
Mikhail Frunze and Klimenty Voroshilov, as well as the future ‘Red Cavalry’ 
commander Semyon Budyennyi, Stalin had disobeyed Trotsky’s dictates from the center. 
Voroshilov and Budyennyi especially combined fierce opposition to the “military 
specialists” with a personal loyalty to Stalin that would later play an important role in the 
early political history of the Soviet Union. Stalin’s and Dzerzhinsky’s commission sided 
with the Ural obkom as expected. Von Hagen summarized the findings: “Harsh criticism 
was leveled against Trotsky’s overreliance on military specialists… The commission 
agreed that party members and commissars exerted little or no influence over military 
specialists. Officers not only interfered with party work but had been known to arrest 
chairmen of party committees and comrades’ courts.”45 
The commission’s findings set the stage for a bitter fight over the direction of 
Army policy at the 8th Congress of the Bolshevik Party in March 1919. Trotsky was not 
unaware of the growing political uncertainty surrounding his choice of military policy. 
He submitted a set of “XIX Theses” to the Bolshevik Central Committee in February 
1919 in an attempt to head off further attacks on his organization of the Red Army. He 
knew he could count on majority support in the powerful Central Committee, and 
attempted to use this support to his advantage. Still, he was aware that he would have to 
tread lightly if he was to avoid an open confrontation with Grigory Zinoviev, Stalin, and 
Dzerzhinsky, who were likely to oppose him no matter what. The result of the 
disagreement was a delicate compromise that paid lip-service to many of the policies of 
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his opponents as “future goals” while insisting on his current course as necessary to 
ensure victory in the Civil War.  
Trotsky began his theses by identifying the ideas of a “people’s militia”, guerrilla 
warfare, and elected commanders as the legacy of petty-bourgeois “Kautskyism.” He 
declared: “When the class struggle has been transformed into open civil war, tearing 
away the veil of bourgeois law and bourgeois-democratic institutions, the slogan of a 
‘people’s militia’ loses all its meaning… and so becomes a weapon for reaction.”46 He 
called the opposition’s demands to implement a militia system now misguided at best, 
and bourgeois philistinism at worst.  What was needed now, he claimed was a military 
program that would guarantee a Red victory, by any means necessary. Harsh discipline, 
“barracks” life for soldiers, conscription etc. were to be viewed as “temporary measures” 
only, put in place to ensure that the nascent Bolshevik state emerged victorious in war. 
The inconsistency between proclaiming workers’ liberty and self-determination while 
subjecting workers to corporal discipline at the hands of former tsarist officers was not 
lost on any conscientious Bolshevik. Trotsky admitted: “These contradictions were not 
accidental deviations, but resulted from the actual circumstances and constituted quite 
unavoidable transitional forms in the work of creating the army in the concrete conditions 
which had been bequeathed to us by the imperialist war and the bourgeois (February) 
revolution.”47 
After painting this picture of the military opposition, Trotsky continued to defend 
the more controversial aspects of Red Army administration. Communists should play a 
larger role in the armed forces, he said, but only as purveyors of Bolshevik ideals. There 
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was no room within the army for an autonomous party organization. Bolsheviks should 
instead work towards increasing the number of Communists directly integrated into the 
ranks as an inspiration to the less politically conscious soldiers. Similarly, commissars 
could best serve the cause by focusing more attention on the political purity of the army. 
Trotsky argued it would be a disservice to the Bolsheviks if commissars attempted to 
assume more responsibility for military matters. This would be a distraction from their 
mission as “bearers of the spirit of our Party.” Trotsky did not attempt to defend Red 
Army disciplinary policies as reflective of Bolshevik ideology. He merely stated that they 
were transitional and would soon pass away. Lastly, Trotsky denied there were any 
grounds to attack the military specialists “on principle.” He repeatedly insisted that it was 
essential to the Red Army’s revolutionary character that its conscripts be either poor 
peasants or workers. Yet class background no longer seemed to matter when it came to 
the officers calling the shots.  
Ultimately, Trotsky’s argument hinged on an appeal not to the consistency of his 
policies with Bolshevik principles, but to the nature of the regime he was serving. Since 
the Bolsheviks were the representatives of the proletarian class in power, it followed that 
they would eventually embody the political ideals of that “class,” regardless of the short-
term reality. Trotsky said: “The revolutionary character of the army is determined above 
all, by the character of the Soviet regime which creates this army, which sets its aims and 
makes it, so to speak, its instrument.”48 He elaborated: “Counter-revolution cannot in any 
way develop out of the regime of proletarian dictatorship; it can establish itself only as a 
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result of a direct and open bloody victory over this regime.”49 The “universal militia” and 
“democratic army” could exist, but only in the future. For now Bolsheviks must content 
themselves with repressive, hierarchical forms of organization. In late February 1919 the 
Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party adopted Trotsky’s “XIX Theses”, but many in 
the Party were still not satisfied.  
At the 8th Party Congress, opposition to Trotsky’s management of the Red Army 
coalesced into two camps. The first camp was composed of “moderate” Bolsheviks who 
worried about insufficient party control over the army. Members of this camp included 
Mikhail Lashevich, Klimenty Voroshilov, and the well-known Central Committee 
members Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, and Zinoviev. These men did not take issue with the need 
for “iron discipline” in the army, nor did they endorse a return to more democratic forms 
of military organization. Their demands can be boiled down to three main points: a 
reduction in status of “military specialists” to a more consultative role; increased control 
for commissars over operational matters; and autonomy for party cells within the 
organizational framework of the Red Army. These men were particularly incensed by 
what they saw as gross abuses of power by the military specialists. The military 
specialists hailed from bourgeois class backgrounds and were proponents of counter-
revolutionary ideals. Their presence in a nominally revolutionary army that was already 
dangerously full of non-proletarian elements (i.e. the peasantry) could only have a 
deleterious effect on the socialist character of the regime. The scholar Francesco 
Benvenuti observed: “Those like Stalin, even though they refrained from voicing broad 
political formulations of an alternative nature, nonetheless viewed official military policy 
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as an unjustifiable means of reinstating men, ideas, and methods that had not been born 
of the revolution.”50 
The frequency with which “military specialists” had defected to the enemy in the 
line of fire was cited as evidence for their dubious loyalty. In the spring of 1919 mass 
desertions from the Red Army continued unabated. Richard Pipes puts the number of 
deserters for February and March 1919 at over 80,000 Red Army men in uniform.51 To 
counter the trend, this wing of the military opposition argued that it was imperative that 
the commissars be given control over combat operations. If Communists controlled the 
army, the toiling classes would be more likely to remain at their posts and to preserve 
discipline. Von Hagen observed: “The Military Opposition contended that the 
commissars deserved more than a narrow control function, because they already had 
more combat experience than many military specialists.”52 It would also be necessary to 
increase the importance of the party’s political departments (politotdely) in day-to-day 
military operations. In the spring of 1919 politotdely responsibilities were limited to 
selecting qualified commissars and disseminating propaganda amongst the troops. The 
“moderate” opposition called for augmenting their powers to include sniffing out and 
removing politically suspect “military specialists” from the army. 
The “Left Communist” faction of the party was even more spirited in their 
opposition to Trotsky’s administration of the Red Army. The “Left Communists” 
considered the Red Army in its current form to be a betrayal of the Revolution. These 
men and women saw the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power a signal to begin immediate 
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construction of a Communist society grounded in egalitarian politics. Forced 
conscription, military discipline, total warfare, and an authoritarian officer corps were all 
relics of the “reactionary” tsarist past and had no place in a socialist society. The” Left 
Communists” proudly affirmed their support for the democratic approach they associated 
with the first phase of the Revolution. Robert Daniels described the dispute: “The essence 
of issue was the same clash of anarchistic idealism and pragmatic predilection for 
traditional organizational forms which divided the Left Communists and the Leninists in 
respect to industrial and labor policy.”53 
The “Left Communists” called for a top-down reversal of military policy. In 
nearly all particulars their demands reiterated the Bolshevik platform prior to the seizure 
of power in October 1917. Coercive disciplinary policies were to be abolished 
immediately. The death penalty and other forms of corporal punishment were rejected as 
repressive and inconsistent with socialism. Officers must be elected by the soldiers under 
their command. Officers would be subject to recall at any time if their orders violated the 
“spirit of Revolution” or otherwise offended their comrades-in-arms. Mandatory 
conscription was to be promptly rejected in favor of an all-volunteer military. Measures 
must be taken to transition to a “universal militia” whereby all citizens of the proper class 
background would receive military training at their place of work. Barracks were to be 
done away with forever, and men and women would be sent into battle alongside their 
co-workers and neighbors. To top it off, traditional styles of warfare were to be 
abandoned. In place of mass divisions and wide fronts, militia units would instead 
operate in flying-squads and adopt guerilla tactics. Local party committees would 
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coordinate the actions of their own militia units and play a major role in defining military 
practice.  
Despite his gifted oratory and administrative capacities, Trotsky was strongly 
disliked by large segments of the party. Trotsky was not unaware of his lack of 
popularity, and this probably played an important role in his decision to avoid the 8th 
Congress. He excused himself by insisting he was needed at the Eastern Front, where 
Kolchak was resuming his attack with great ferocity. In a risky move, Trotsky promoted a 
Central Committee decision to order all Congress delegates from the party’s military 
organizations also to return to the front. The party’s military organizations generally 
opposed Trotsky’s line, and resented what they saw as an attempt to silence their dissent. 
Benvenuti said of the incident: “Trotsky replied to this ‘interpretation’ during the 
meeting, by referring to ‘the extremely serious situation’ that had arisen on the eastern 
front.”54 Following the outcry from militants in the military, the Central Committee 
reversed its decision and allowed the delegates from the fronts to attend. The 8th Party 
Congress was the largest forum to-date for determining Bolshevik military policy. 
Trotsky was absent; his opponents were there in full force. 
The first sessions of the 8th Congress began in Moscow on 18 March 1919. More 
than four hundred delegates attended, over forty of them served in the armed forces or the 
party military organizations. Military matters occupied a prominent place on the 
Congress’ agenda. The debate between supporters of Trotsky’s leadership and the 
military opposition was initially conducted at an open session of the Congress on March 
20. At Trotsky’s request, the party veteran Grigorii Sokolnikov spoke in favor of the 
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official Red Army line. Vladimir Smirnov, a former Left Socialist Revolutionary and 
“Left Communist”, spoke on behalf of Trotsky’s opponents. Smirnov mentioned widely 
divergent criticisms of Trotsky. 
Sokolnikov was the first to speak, he based his speech almost entirely on 
Trotsky’s “XIX Theses”. Sokolnikov had the advantage of endorsing a coherent set of 
policies. He also benefitted from the Central Committee’s explicit endorsement of 
Trotsky’s theses less than a month earlier. Sokolnikov did not stray from Trotsky’s 
strategies in the theses. He identified the use of military specialists, harsh discipline, and 
conscription as the necessary means for winning a difficult war and preserving socialist 
power. Communist power should be increased the army, but only within the existing 
framework of Red Army protocol. This meant training more workers and peasants as 
officers and increasing Bolshevik propaganda, but not doing away with military 
specialists or limiting their powers.  
A large part of Sokolnikov’s speech was devoted to a negative characterization of 
the Left Communists’ platform within the wider military opposition. These Bolsheviks 
were portrayed as advocates for a backwards, pre-modern style of partisan warfare that 
would inevitably end in the destruction of the Bolshevik Party. Sokolnikov borrowed 
directly from Trotsky’s claim that, “Preaching guerrillaism as a military program is 
equivalent to advocating a reversion from large-scale industry to the handicraft system. 
Such advocacy is fully in accordance with the nature of intellectual groups which are 
incapable of wielding state power, incapable of seriously conceiving the task of wielding 
this power, and which results in guerilla (polemical or terroristic) forays against the 
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workers’ power.”55 Sokolnikov attempted to tar the opposition by imputing to it 
Menshevik/Socialist-Revolutionary sympathies. Sokolnikov ended his speech in a 
conciliatory fashion, promising after a Red victory to implement many of the 
opposition’s more-democratic ideals. Benvenuti summarized: “Like the theses, 
Sokolnikov concluded by deferring to a not-too-distant future: once ‘communist society’ 
was in a position to afford a ‘communist militia’, certain features of ‘partisan’ 
democratism could be ‘resuscitated’.”56 
Smirnov’s speech was a delicate effort to focus the debate on those issues upon 
which the military opposition agreed. He began by noting that opposition to military 
specialists stemmed from the poor quality and dubious loyalty of many specialists. He 
insisted this was reason enough for increasing the importance of the commissars. 
Commissars should have their authority increased to include operational matters--- on top 
of oversight and political duties. Smirnov was especially hostile to the harsh disciplinary 
code prevailing in the army. He stressed that the current emphasis on coercion made it 
difficult for peasant conscripts to differentiate between the old tsarist army and the new 
socialist one.  Especially egregious were those statutes that fixed relations between 
enlisted men and officers, such as the provision that guaranteed officers separate living 
quarters. Benvenuti condensed Smirnov’s argument: “Certainly statues were necessary, 
but they should not give peasant soldiers the impression that they were still in the old 
Imperial Army.”57 Lastly, Smirnov advocated greater autonomy and a broader role for 
party organizations operating at the fronts. 
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Following Smirnov’s speech, the debate was moved to a closed session at the 
request of the Central Committee. The full minutes of this session were not made public 
for decades. Behind closed doors many party members spoke out against the current 
military policy of the War Commissariat, including Stalin. When a vote was held where 
delegates were asked to choose between the rival camps of Trotsky and Smirnov, a 
majority of delegates sided with the opposition. At this moment of heightened tension, 
Lenin addressed the Congress and weighed in largely on the side of Trotsky. From here 
the opposition splintered between those who wished to retain the gist of the War 
Commissariat’s policies, and those who advocated a more radical set of “left” military 
policies. In a moment of irony, Stalin and Zinoviev now found themselves defending 
much of Trotsky’s program. Following this closed session, a special committee of three 
Central Committee men and two representatives of the “military opposition” was created 
to draft a compromise resolution.  
On the face of it, the compromise was a victory for Trotsky’s position. The 
resolution was set down in the theses format that was largely a modified form of 
Trotsky’s original “XIX Theses”. Military specialists were retained, while the idea of a 
militia was endorsed for the distant future. Harsh disciplinary measures were largely 
preserved. Conscription was maintained over voluntary recruitment. Still, the resolution 
criticized Trotsky. Commissars saw their powers augmented beyond anything Trotsky 
had supported. In addition to their duties to counter-sign operational orders, commissars 
were now given broad disciplinary powers--- including augmented powers of arrest. 
Theoretically, this included the right to arrest military specialists of suspect loyalty 
without clearing those decisions with higher-ups in the War Commissariat. High-ranking 
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commissars were given control of the special sections (osobye otdely) responsible for 
secret police functions in the army, a role previously reserved for members of the Cheka. 
Of equal importance was the decision to recommend future revision of the service 
regulations of the Red Army, including those provisions pertaining to relations between 
officers and the rank-and-file. Lastly, decision-making in the Bolsheviks’ political 
organizations within the Red Army was shifted from front commands to the army and 
divisional level. In practice, this made it harder for the center to impose its own 
“pragmatic” perspective on its military operatives. Also, the resolution called for the 
holding of periodic conferences for party members at the front where questions of 
military policy could be discussed. In keeping with the devolution of power to divisional 
organizations, local party members would now have a greater say on military matters. 
This would bring more opportunities to criticize Trotsky’s “reactionary” policies for 
those party members serving in the armed forces. 
Trotsky was absent from the Congress, but he closely followed its proceedings. 
The Congress came to an end on 23 March 1919. Trotsky’s response was swift. On 25 
March he wrote “To the communists of the Eastern Front” for the party newspaper 
published onboard his armored train. In many ways the article was a direct rebuke of 
party members in the military who questioned his authority. To quote the article at 
length: “There were concentrations of Communists who saw it as one of their most 
important tasks to criticize and condemn our military system, passing resolutions to this 
effect, resolving that decorations are unnecessary, protesting against the internal service 
regulations, and so on and so forth. This led in its turn to conflicts with those 
Communists who conscientiously carried out the party’s policy. These conflicts then 
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resulted in weakening internal relations and discipline, and had most pernicious 
repercussions in all spheres of work, and consequently in the army’s combat capacity.”58 
Between 26 and 31 March Trotsky responded directly to the Central Committee. With 
regards to a reformulation of service regulations, he called for Smirnov himself to outline 
concrete alternatives. He accused those who protested against the military specialists of 
being slovenly and ill-informed. He firmly rejected a call for relaxing army discipline, as 
well as any attempts to guarantee communists serving in the military autonomy from 
their commanding officers or other special privileges. 
The 8th Congress was supposed to resolve outstanding disputes between Trotsky’s 
supporters and his opponents. For awhile the grave military situation at the front largely 
ensured this was a reality. On 6 March 1919 Admiral Kolchak’s forces resumed their 
offensive in the Urals. The Red Armies on this front were caught completely off guard. 
The First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Armies arrayed against the Kolchak in the 
East had failed to rest and resupply over the two months since they were attacked. In fact, 
valuable troops and supplies had actually been diverted to the Southern and Southwestern 
fronts. As Trotsky said at the time: “On the other side, after our successes on the Volga, 
the central Soviet government concentrated all attention on the Southern front, to which 
strong units were sent from the Eastern front, while experienced, energetic leaders were 
also transferred thither. The result was that our front in the East was weakened.”59 Within 
a week the decision to divert forces from the east was exposed as a strategic blunder. On 
13 March Kolchak’s armies took the important city of Ufa in the western Urals. Trotsky 
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had scarcely exaggerated the threat when he cited the emergency on the Eastern Front as 
grounds to recuse himself from the Congress.  
For nearly a month and a half, the Red Army suffered defeat after defeat. 
Trotsky’s frequent presence at the fronts proved insufficient to halt the rout. Soviet 
control of the Volga was once again in jeopardy. Lincoln outlined the setbacks: “By the 
middle of April, the Whites had driven a wedge more than a hundred miles wide between 
the Fifth and Second Red Armies… Their advance units stood less than sixty miles from 
Samara, less than seventy from Simbirsk, and a mere fifty-six miles from Kazan.”60 Even 
Lenin and Trotsky found it hard not to panic: each made frequent reference to the grave 
danger posed by Kolchak’s forces while reccomending drastic solutions. Some of the 
extreme measures taken to combat the situation at the front made Trotsky uneasy. His 
conflict at the Congress with party members in the military had not been forgotten. 
During the week of the Congress Trotsky had directly attacked Communists serving on 
the Eastern Front, saying, “We must seek in the work of the Communists one of the 
reasons for the setbacks that have befallen us.”61 The majority of the Central Committee 
did not share in his lack of enthusiasm for the Communists at the fronts. During March 
and April thousands of Bolshevik Party members were specially drafted for service in the 
fight against Kolchak. Lincoln observed: “Before the end of May, some twenty thousand 
Bolshevik Party members and another sixty thousands elite workers had been sent to the 
East. The newly organized Komsomol (Kommunisticheskyi Soyuz Molodezhi), the 
Communist Youth League, sent three thousand of its best members.”62 The heightened 
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role of Communists in active service promoted tension between party activists and 
“military specialists.” Party members continuously blamed the specialists for the setbacks 
that befell the Red Army in spring and summer 1919. 
Tensions continued to escalate with the April appointment of Mikhail Frunze as 
commander of the First, Fourth and Fifth Armies on the Eastern Front. The decision was 
made in spite of Trotsky’s wishes. As party militants ascended through the ranks, 
“military specialists” with ample combat experience were relieved of command, or even 
arrested. Trotsky opposed the new course, but with diminishing success. He wrote in 
summer 1919: “Those who are concerned first and foremost in this matter are the 
overwhelming majority of the honourable commanders. This majority, who already have 
rendered so many services to the Soviet country to their credit, will not allow isolated 
scoundrels to drive their poisoned splinters into the body of our army and spread panicky 
suspicion of the commanding apparatus as a whole.”63 By April the purges were severe 
enough to merit Vatsetis writing directly to Lenin to complain: “Every commissar has his 
secret desire to catch our staff officers out in some counter-revolutionary attitude or 
treachery. This seems a very strange way to behave, since that sort of behavior was a 
typical feature of the gendarmes of the old regime.”64 
Frunze proved to be a gifted military commander, beyond the talents of many 
other Bolshevik loyalists turned officers. Within a week of his appointment, Frunze had 
halted Kolchak’s advances. The White forces began to overstretch their lines of supply 
and communication. On 28 April 1919 Frunze ordered his forces to go over to the 
                                                          
63
 Trotsky, How the Revolution Armed, Volume II, p. 132 
64
 V. P. Butt, ed., The Russian Civil War: Documents from the Soviet Archives, (New York: St. Martin's, 
1996),  p. 104 
62 
 
offensive against Kolchak. The month of May saw Kolchak mount a vain effort to 
contain the advancing Red Army. The offensive on the Eastern Front marked the rise of 
dozens of Bolshevik military heroes, including Vasilii Chapaev and the future hero of 
Stalingrad and Berlin--- Vasilii Chuikov. On 9 June forces commanded by Chapaev 
occupied Ufa. Kolchak would never again pose a serious threat to the Red Army. The 
White threat from the East was all but eliminated on the western side of the Urals. The 
Red Army retook Kolchak’s capital at Omsk on 14 November 1919.  
The victories of the Red Army in the eastern theater were accompanied by a 
deterioration of the situation in the south. As Chapaev’s men stormed Ufa, Denikin’s 
Volunteer Army was busy driving the last of the Bolsheviks from the North Caucasus. In 
late spring and early summer Denikin added two new groups: Baron Pyotr Wrangel’s 
Caucasus Army, and the Don Cossacks (who replaced Krasnov as ataman with the more 
receptive General Sidorin in February). During the last two weeks of June, Denikin’s 
men launched a renewed offensive that resulted in the complete collapse of the Red 
Army’s Southern Front. On 30 June 1919 both Kharkov and Tsaritsyn fell to the 
Volunteers. Denikin’s men threatened to press their victories with a three-pronged attack 
aimed at the heart of Bolshevik-held Central Russia. 
Denikin’s victories led to full-fledged panic at the highest levels of the Red Army 
and the Bolshevik Party. They also fueled a heated dispute that resulted in one of 
Trotsky’s most humiliating defeats during the Civil War period. Alarmed by the growing 
threat in the south, Trotsky and his allies in the Red Army high command (including 
Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis) called for an immediate halt to Frunze’s offensive in the 
Urals. They argued that the advance should stop at Ufa, where Kolchak would be 
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contained until the spring of 1920. The bulk of the Red Army’s resources would instead 
be transferred to the south where they would confront the Volunteer Army and head off 
an attack on the Bolsheviks’ industrial heartland. This argument was generally supported 
by a majority of the “military specialists” in the upper ranks of the Red Army high 
command. Trotsky summarized his view of the situation at the end of June: “After a few 
weeks there will be a decisive turn on the Southern front. In these transitional weeks all 
forces and resources must be put at the service of the troops on the Southern front.”65 
This view was hotly contested by a majority of the Bolshevik Central Committee 
and a majority of prominent Communist-military officers. Without denying the gravity of 
events in the south, Sergei Kamenev and Mikhail Frunze argued that a halt to the 
offensive in the Urals would be tantamount to defeatism. Political heavyweights such as 
Stalin, Zinoviev, and Lenin supported Kamenev’s and Frunze’s proposals. The situation 
was not without bitter political overtones. During the spring of 1919 Trotsky had replaced 
Kamenev as Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front with the ineffectual tsarist officer 
General Samoilov. Samoilov proved completely inept. So Trotsky was forced to agree to 
Kamenev’s reinstatement at the end of June 1919. The first real shots in the dispute were 
fired in Petrograd by Stalin himself. Stalin had been sent to take command of the city’s 
defenses in May 1919. A revolt by part of the city’s garrison on 13 June 1919 was met 
with the most vicious terror. Stalin attributed the revolt to collaboration between the 
garrison’s “military specialist” officers and British naval units operating in the Gulf of 
Finland. Stalin returned to Moscow at the beginning of June 1919 intent on exposing the 
growing treachery of “military specialists” while undermining Trotsky politically. 
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 The growing party infighting signaled a return to the open dispute between Stalin 
and Trotsky over “military specialists” that had last surfaced in summer 1918. In that 
episode Trotsky had successfully defended his argument for officers’ superiority and 
Stalin had been dismissed from his command of Tsaritsyn’s defense. This time Stalin was 
to gain the upper hand politically. Stalin seized on the growing dispute over strategy in 
the east to urge that Vatsetis be replaced as Commander-in-Chief of all Red Army forces 
by his rival (and Trotsky’s opponent), Kamenev. Stalin drew special attention to 
Trotsky’s close ties to previously inept tsarist officers (i.e. Samoilov) as further evidence 
why Vatsetis’ cautious strategy was inappropriate and as evidence of Trotsky’s possible 
political duplicity. On 3 July 1919 Stalin convinced a majority of the Central Committee 
to dismiss Vatsetis as Commander-in-Chief and to replace him with Kamenev. At the 
same time, Vatsetis and three of Trotsky’s allies were dismissed from the Revolutionary 
Military Council. Kamenev and three other Stalin allies replaced them. Lincoln observed: 
“As commissar for war Trotsky remained the council’s chairman, but Stalin’s allies could 
outvote him by a margin of two to one.”66 Just to make sure Trotsky had no lingering 
doubts about who was running the show, Vatsetis was arrested not long after his 
dismissal for leading a “White-guardist organization.” When evidence for such absurd 
claims against a prominent military hero of the Revolution were not forthcoming, the 
charges were dropped, but Stalin had sent his message. Trotsky’s military specialists 
would now be subject to humiliation, arrest, or worse if they failed to show sufficient 
deference to Stalin.  
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Trotsky lost no time in disputing Kamenev’s new war plan. While Kamenev 
conceded the importance of concentrating the bulk of the Red Army’s resources on the 
Southern Front, he disagreed with Trotsky on how these forces should be positioned. 
Kamenev argued for utilizing the select Ninth and Tenth Armies to direct the bulk of the 
Red Army counterattack down the Volga towards Tsaritsyn. From there the Red Army 
could split the Novocherkassk-Rostov rail lines and deny Denikin crucial supplies from 
his allies abroad. Trotsky argued such an attack would put Red forces at the mercy of the 
anti-Communist population of the Don region. Trotsky proposed to conduct the main 
counterattack in Donbas around Kharkov, a region with an industrial population more 
sympathetic to the Bolsheviks, but also a much higher concentration of enemy units. 
Lincoln condensed this argument: “The advantage of operating in territory inhabited by a 
friendly population, with a dense network of roads and railways to bring in 
reinforcements, ammunition, and weapons, Trotsky insisted, would more than offset the 
difficulties of attacking Denikin’s stronger center rather than his weaker flank.”67 On 5 
July 1919 the Central Committee voted to endorse Kamenev’s directives; a furious 
Trotsky offered to resign his posts in protest. Only Lenin’s decisive intervention 
prevented the Committee from accepting Trotsky’s resignation; Lenin personally 
convinced him to remain in charge of the Red Army. 
Events proved Trotsky correct. By mid-August the 50,000 strong Ninth and Tenth 
Armies launched their counterattack down the Volga only to be halted by troops fighting 
under Baron Wrangel. Just as the Red Army launched its counterattack on the Volga, the 
Don Cossack General Mamontov was launching a daring cavalry raid behind Red Army 
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lines, beginning a forty-day reign of terror that resulted in the sacking of Tambov and 
Voronezh. As Mamontov’s raid wrapped up in September, the Red Army offensive 
ground to a halt outside of Tsaritsyn. Trotsky’s strategy was vindicated, yet he was 
embarrassed by his refusal to support a significant cavalry force for the Red Army. 
Trotsky had earlier attacked the cavalry as a legacy of the aristocratic classes that was 
incompatible with “proletarian” forms of warfare. A lack of cavalry had severely 
inhibited the Red Army’s ability to defend against Mamontov’s fast-moving raiders. To 
his credit, Trotsky realized his error and promptly began to rally support for a Red Army 
cavalry force. On 1 September 1919 Trotsky proclaimed: “All that is needed is that the 
creation of a cavalry force should become a task for the working masses. It is necessary 
that the proletariat grasp the importance for the cause of the revolution of this new step 
forward. The Soviet Republic needs cavalry. Red cavalrymen, forward! To horse, 
proletarians!”68 As a result, Stalin’s military ally Semyon Budyonnyi rapidly assembled 
the First Red Cavalry, which would go on to play a decisive role in Red Army victories 
by late October. 
Just as the Red Army reversed course on the use of cavalry, so too did it redirect 
its forces to counter the Volunteers’ main attack from the Donbas. At the end of 
September, Denikin’s Volunteers captured the city of Orel in the Bolsheviks’ heartland. 
Denikin was now just 220 miles away from Moscow. As if things could not get any 
worse, a new and dangerous threat unexpectedly formed on the Bolsheviks’ Northwestern 
periphery. Throughout 1919 British naval units had hounded the Bolsheviks’ meager 
Baltic fleet around Petrograd, even sinking a few Bolshevik vessels. They had also 
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applied steady pressure to anti-Communist Russian exiles in the newly independent 
Baltic states to unite their forces and march on Petrograd. By fall 1919 their efforts were 
beginning to bear fruit. In August 1919 the counterrevolutionary General Nikolai 
Yudenich helped organize the anti-Bolshevik “Northwestern Government” in 
independent Estonia. By September he had rallied over 17,000 men to serve under his 
banner and had solicited numerous arms and supplies from his British allies.  
On 28 September 1919 Yudenich’s forces crossed the Estonian border and went 
over to the offensive against the Bolsheviks. In less than a week, Yudenich cut the rail 
line between Pskov and Petrograd, opening a clear path to Petrograd. Leading Bolsheviks 
had failed to reckon on an unexpected assault on their northwestern periphery. The 
Central Committee and Red Army high command panicked: even Lenin called on the 
party to evacuate its forces from Petrograd. At this point, a surprising alliance between 
Stalin and Trotsky intervened to restore confidence in the startled Bolshevik ranks. Both 
men stressed the grave political consequences of abandoning the city that had given birth 
to the February and October Revolutions. Trotsky himself asked to depart immediately 
for the Petrograd front to assume command of its defenses. On 16 October Trotsky 
rushed by rail to Petrograd, just as Yudenich’s forces were occupying the Petrograd 
suburb of Gatchina.  En route to Petrograd, Trotsky summoned the city’s workers to 
battle: “Get ready, Petrograd! More than once have October days been great days in your 
history. Destiny summons you to write during this October a fresh and perhaps most 
glorious page in the history of the proletarian struggle.”69 
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It is impossible objectively to assess the effect of Trotsky’s presence at the front. 
Disciples of Trotsky have described his role as decisive, as did the hagiographer Isaac 
Deutscher: “On horseback Trotsky gathered terror-stricken and retreating men and led 
them back to the fighting-line.”70 On 19 October 1919 Yudenich’s forces stormed the 
Pulkovo Heights overlooking the city, as Trotsky addressed the same Petrograd Soviet he 
had presided over in 1905 and 1917. His words stirred the hearts of Bolshevik faithful, 
and are worth quoting at length: “I shall not hide from you that I came here with a heart 
full of anxiety…The city which has suffered so much, which has burned internally, which 
has so often been subjected to dangers, which has never spared itself, which has stripped 
itself so bare – this Red Petrograd is still what it was, the torchbearer of the revolution, 
the rock of steel on which we shall build the church of the future. And, backed by the 
combined forces of the whole country, we shall surrender this Petrograd to no-one.”71 
If Trotsky’s words were effective, so to was the massive influx of reinforcements 
flooding the city from Moscow by rail. Yudenich’s failure to cut the rail-link to the 
Bolshevik capital was a critical mistake. His offensive collapsed as rapidly as it had 
mounted. On 21 October a reinvigorated Bolshevik force drove Yudenich from the 
Pulkovo Heights, beginning a counterattack that would not halt until the Red Army had 
driven the enemy to Estonia and completely destroyed Yudenich’s Northwestern Army. 
On 7 November 1919, the second anniversary of the Revolution, Trotsky returned to 
Moscow personally to report the victory in Petrograd to an overjoyed Central Committee. 
Trotsky’s three weeks in Petrograd had witnessed equally momentous victories on the 
Southern Front.  If Trotsky’s command of Petrograd’s defense was one of his finest 
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personal triumphs, he could also claim some credit for the recent victories against 
Denikin in the south. Denikin’s seemingly unstoppable advance towards Moscow, 
combined with the failure of Kamenev’s strategy to make serious progress on the Volga, 
led the Central Committee to reevaluate its plan. In October 1919 the Central Committee 
reversed its decision and endorsed a plan backed by Trotsky. The Red Army would now 
divide its counterattack into two main wedges. One force would attack at Denikin’s left 
flank in the Ukraine while the other group continued Kamenev’s earlier attack down the 
Volga. A major victory by Budyennyi’s Red Cavalry at Voronezh on 24 October forced 
Denikin’s forward units to retreat, signaling the first of many reversals for the Volunteer 
Army and the success of Trotsky’s strategy. 
The second anniversary of the October Revolution also marked the little over a 
year-and-a-half since Trotsky had risen to command the Red Army. He had transformed a 
motley band of disorganized militia into a disciplined fighting force. Grave threats had 
been beaten back on multiple fronts. Yet many questions remained unanswered. The 
events of 1919 had invigorated opponents of “military specialists” and had fostered 
renewed calls for a more “socialist” Red Army. Large sections of the Soviet Republic 
remained outside of effective Bolshevik control, the Ukraine was plagued by anarchic 
violence, and Siberia was still occupied by forces hostile to the regime. Heightened 
tensions with the nascent Polish Republic threatened a renewed outbreak of widespread 
military conflict. Last but not least, growing dissatisfaction amongst crucial sectors of 
support for the Bolsheviks undermined a tenuous social compact between the regime and 
the governed. Two more years of civil war lay ahead.  
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Chapter Three: Trotsky and the End of the Civil War, Late 1919 to 1922 
“The workers’ and peasants’ army, which has protected the workers and peasants with 
its blood from the onslaught of the landlords and capitalists, must now apply all its free 
forces and resources to helping the cause of the country’s economic rebirth.”- Lev  
Trotsky, February 192072 
 
 Fall 1919 marked the high-water point for those forces opposing the Bolsheviks in 
the Russian Civil War. Yudenich’s army had been decisively defeated on the outskirts of 
Petrograd; his army had ceased to exist by December 1919. The Bolsheviks’ conquest of 
Admiral Kolchak’s forces at Omsk was followed by his execution on 7 February 1920. 
Denikin’s defeats in late October 1919 marked the beginning of the end for the Volunteer 
Army. Throughout the winter of 1919 and into the spring of 1920, the Red Army drove 
the Volunteers south. What had begun as a retreat quickly deteriorated into an irreversible 
rout. On 17 December, 1919 the Red Army recaptured Kiev. In early 1920, therefore, 
many Bolsheviks assumed the worst of the Civil War violence was over. Trotsky made 
note of the victories: “In the struggle against this all-powerful force, our Red Army has 
shown itself equal to its task. This has been acknowledged by those opponents who were 
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saying eighteen months ago: ‘You won’t create an army’, and who now say: ‘You have 
created an army, and a good one.’ And how can they not say that, when this army is 
beating, over an expanse of nine or ten thousand versts, the enemy mobilized and armed 
by world capital?”73 
 The victorious powers of World War I had sustained the White movement for two 
years. Hundreds of thousands of tons of arms, ammunition, uniforms, and even tanks and 
airplanes had been supplied to the various White armies. Fourteen nations had pledged to 
oppose the Bolshevik state in what Winston Churchill had called “the anti-Bolshevik 
crusade.” France, Great Britain, Italy, the United States, and Japan had all sent troops to 
Russian soil. Although direct confrontations between armed Bolsheviks and the Allies 
were rare, the Bolshevik propaganda exploited the foreign presence to maximum effect. 
The collapse of the White resistance in the fall of 1919 was a decisive blow to Churchill 
and others who sought to maintain external military pressure on the Soviet state. Aid to 
the Whites was increasingly regarded as a waste of time and money. The need for 
Western European governments to rebuild at home after years of war took precedence 
over their assertion of power abroad. Public figures advocating trade and engagement 
with the Bolsheviks, such as the British Prime Minister Lloyd George, asserted 
themselves politically. Mawdsley noted: “By late autumn 1919 the flow of arms had 
begun to dry up, and then the winter of military disasters in Siberia and the Kuban 
seemed to prove that the Whites had no future. The British now wanted to normalize 
relations with Moscow, and they tried to interpose themselves between Reds and 
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Whites.”74 The possibility of an imminent conclusion to Allied intervention strengthened 
the convictions of leading Bolsheviks that an end to civil war was just around the corner. 
 Still, Bolshevik power was far from secure. After six years of uninterrupted 
warfare, Russia’s economy was in ruins. The civil war had led to a dramatic decline in 
population. Suny recorded the immense scale of the calamity: “At least 1 million people 
died in combat or from White or Red acts of terror during the Russian civil war. Several 
million more died from disease, hunger, and the cold. About a million people left the 
country and never returned.”75 Nowhere was the decline in population more in evidence 
than in the industrial cities of Central Russia which were home to the proletariat upon 
whom the Bolshevik Party relied for political and economic support. The violent 
upheaval of civil war had severed the ties between city and countryside. The workers and 
their representatives in the Soviet government lacked both finished goods and viable 
currency to exchange for food. The Bolsheviks resorted to requisitioning. Hundreds of 
thousands still starved.  In the wake of mass starvation came epidemic diseases that led 
thousands more to perish. Recurring typhus epidemics were especially lethal. Many 
workers who were still able fled the cities. The historian Diane Koenker described the 
scale of the exodus: “Moscow’s population towards the end of the Civil War was thus 
half of what it had been in the midst of the 1917 revolution. An even more catastrophic 
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fall occurred in Petrograd: its population plummeted from 2.5 million in 1917 to 700,000 
in 1920.”76  
 Population losses were aggravated by diminished supplies of raw materials. Fuel 
for industries grew scarce as coal and timber disappeared from the cities. Crucial 
resources such as iron, lead, and copper were similarly scarce. Industry ground to a 
virtual halt. By the end of the civil war, the Bolsheviks assembled just 50,000 rifles a 
month, a fraction of the pre-Revolutionary output. As a consequence, less than half of all 
Red Army soldiers were armed at the beginning of 1920.77 The manufacture of 
ammunition, uniforms, and artillery fared no better. The lack of provisions for the army 
was a reminder of the overall weakness of the Soviet state.  
In June 1918 all factories directly involved in the manufacture of war materials 
were placed under the control of Trotsky’s War Commissariat to combat the Red Army’s 
deficiencies in supplies. A special regime of military discipline in the workplace was 
introduced to guarantee production. After this militarization of the defense industry, 
Trotsky worked to apply military methods to other branches of the economy. As he 
proclaimed in early 1920: “Inasmuch as the army possesses the greatest amount of 
experience of mass Soviet organization of this type, its methods and procedures must 
(with all necessary modifications) be transferred to the sphere of labor organization.”78 
He began to perceive the militarization of the entire economy as a remedy for three of the 
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most serious disorders afflicting the Soviet economy: worker absenteeism, a collapse in 
the transportation network, and an unreliable supply of raw materials (including basic 
foodstuffs). 
The failure of a large portion of the urban labor force to report to work on a 
regular basis was a crucial handicap to overall productivity. Increased wages were useless 
as incentives. Inflation had robbed the ruble of its value. State wages were too small to 
purchase the food necessary for survival, so workers took days off to scavenge for food 
or work higher-paying moonlight jobs. By late 1919, payment-in-kind was the only truly 
effective means of compensating workers, yet the government had no surplus 
commodities with which to make these reimbursements. As punishment and payment 
grew less effective, the number of workers reporting for duty declined. The scholar 
Silvana Malle has documented the scale of absenteeism: “In the first quarter of 1920, 
overall absenteeism in Russia was computed at about 40-50 percent of the total 
workforce.”79 The seriousness of the problem was not lost on Trotsky, who declared: 
“Whoever falls to come to work on time, or who wastes his time when in the workshop, 
or occupies himself there with work ‘on the side’, or simply stays away on a workday, is 
an enemy of socialist Russia who is undermining her future.”80 The Bolsheviks’ inability 
to induce the proletariat to work was partly due to the hunger and disease which 
continued to plague urban areas throughout Russia. Workers were so physically 
weakened by illness that they could not drag themselves to work on a daily basis. 
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Many plants were also idled by a lack of fuel, or of raw materials, or of both. 
Prior to winter 1919-1920, the industrial heartland of Central Russia was cut off from the 
majority of the former Russian Empire. Regions such as the Caucasus, Siberia, Central 
Asia, and the Donbas that had supplied crucial resources such as coal, timber, cotton, and 
iron had ceased to provide inputs for Bolshevik production. The dearth of fuel and metals 
was especially harmful to war production. As Lincoln observed: “Russia’s mills and 
factories faced the winter of 1919-1920 with only a tenth of the fuel they needed… With 
too few raw materials and too little fuel, iron production in 1920 fell to about a fortieth of 
the prewar figure. Steel stood at a sixtieth and copper production stopped altogether.”81 
At the beginning of 1920, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia, and Ukraine were 
all well on their way to being absorbed into the Bolshevik polity. The new territories held 
desperately needed natural resources, but the Bolsheviks lacked the means to access 
them. This was in large part due to the disintegration of Russia’s transportation grid, 
especially the railroads. In October 1917 the Bolsheviks inherited over 350,000 working 
freight cars and 15,000 functioning locomotives, along with a network of tracks that 
stretched over 30,000 miles. During the war the party proved of incapable of maintaining 
rail transport. Hundreds of thousands of freight cars and thousands of locomotives broke 
down. The historian William Rosenberg described the decline: “By the end of 1918 the 
amount of freight carried on these lines had fallen almost 70 percent. In August 1918, 
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only some 9,000 freight cars were loaded or unloaded. Eighteen months later, in January 
1920, the figure had barely risen to 12,000.”82 
Over the winter of 1919-1920, Trotsky reflected on the relationship between the 
worsening economic situation and the heightened prospects for domestic peace. At this 
point the Red Army was well on its way to reaching its peak enlistment of over five-and-
a-half million soldiers, which was achieved by late 1920. An end to combat operations 
would mean a large number of these men would have to be demobilized, and could 
therefore be directed to the urgent task of rebuilding the economy. It also meant that the 
Bolsheviks would finally have an opportunity to transition to the militia system they had 
so long endorsed. For Trotsky the transition to a militia system and a gradual 
militarization of the economy were inseparable. He began to elaborate a plan for their 
realization. 
Earlier proponents of a socialist militia had envisioned factories as the basis for a 
self-sufficient military unit. Men would train under arms alongside their fellow 
proletarians at their place of work. In the event of war, they would enter combat in units 
that were formed from their local production brigades. Trotsky took this thesis and turned 
it on its head. If the workers of a factory, mine, or lumber camp could provide the basis 
for a military unit, then, he argued, a military unit could just as easily provide the 
workforce for a factory, mine, or lumber camp. Economic decline stemmed from 
insufficient organization on the part of the state and from the unwillingness of large 
sectors of the population to cooperate in the building of socialism. His proposed solution 
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was a state-directed mobilization of labor to fulfill the socialist economic plan. Trotsky 
described his vision in late 1919: “Socialist economy presupposes a general plan that 
embraces the [country’s] entire territory, with all its natural resources, means of 
production and live human powers…  The continuity and completeness of the production 
process must be sustained and ensured by universal labor service, under which every 
able-bodied citizen, within certain age limits, is obliged to devote a certain part of his 
time to one branch or another of the production process.”83 
Trotsky outlined his plan to transform of the economic and military spheres in a 
set of twenty-three theses on December 1919. He asserted that a central plan must be at 
the heart of a socialist economy, and that such a plan could only be implemented by 
militarizing the entire labor force. As part of this process, the “anarchy” of the market 
would be replaced by discipline and reason. Army discipline would be applied to 
economic life. In each locality, the mobilization of the labor force would be tied to the 
creation of a local militia. The War Commissariat would be responsible for directing the 
mobilization. While the mobilization was to occur gradually, Trotsky argued the process 
should begin as soon as possible. An initial plan could focus on militarizing workers in 
coal and iron mines, and in the country’s most important state factories. 
Trotsky’s campaign for the militarization of labor received a major boost with the 
creation of the First Revolutionary Labor Army on 15 January 1920. The First Labor 
Army was created from the already existing Third Red Army after it had ceased combat 
operations in the Urals. The original proposal for the labor army came unsolicited from 
the leadership of the Third Army’s Revolutionary Military Council at the beginning of 
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January. Benvenuti described the situation: “An example was set by the eastern front 3rd 
army, whose leaders resolved to proceed, at the beginning of January, with a radical 
conversion of their unit’s tasks.”84 Bolshevik Party members on the unit’s Council were 
well aware of the party’s heightened interest in putting the armed forces to work to repair 
the nation’s economy. The leaders of the Third Army argued their location in the Urals 
presented them with a unique opportunity. The region was close to the relatively 
abundant West Siberian food stores that could sustain a prolonged military presence. 
Local factories had a need for disciplined workers, and skilled and semi-skilled workers 
currently serving in the Third Army could provide such a labor force. Even unskilled 
Third Army soldiers could be highly useful if they were dispatched to harvest local 
supplies of timber, ore, and coal. 
Trotsky received the proposal and forwarded it to Lenin. Both men 
enthusiastically championed the idea at a Council of People’s Commissars on 13 January 
1920. The initiative received the Council’s unanimous support; two days later the First 
Revolutionary Labor Army was born. Its creation was made official by an order from 
Trotsky that spelled out the Labor Army’s duties. The army was to remain at arms and be 
prepared to deploy for combat, if needed. The Labor Army’s primary functions were to 
requisition grain and gather scarce coal and lumber. Skilled laborers would be deployed 
to select factories to work alongside the local proletariat. The Labor Army would be 
controlled by the unit’s Revolutionary Military Council, which would also be expanded 
to include representatives of “the main economic institutions of the Soviet Republic.” 
The unit would in no way be answerable to local party organs--- a provision bound to 
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rankle regional authorities. The Labor Army would keep detailed records of resource 
inputs and production outputs, so that a clear picture of the unit’s progress could be 
measured by central party authorities. Those soldiers temporarily acting as workers 
would still be subject to the Red Army’s disciplinary policy. Failure to report to work 
would be considered an act of desertion and would be punished accordingly. 
Trotsky and Lenin were so enthusiastic about the prospects for expanding on the 
Third Army’s experiment that, two days later, they drafted plans to create similar forces 
in the Kuban, Ukraine, Kazan, and Petrograd. Their proposals were approved by the 
Politburo on 18 January 1920. Over the next two years, nine labor armies were formed 
from existing units of the Red Army. These units greatly expanded the influence of 
Trotsky and other military leaders over the Soviet economy. Supporters of the project 
credited the labor armies with extending “socialist” forms of production to marginal 
regions of the country. Labor armies were even credited with exceeding their civilian 
peers in productivity, although any accurate comparison between the two must take into 
account the superior food rations and living conditions of the soldiers. Trotsky praised the 
armies’ superior output: “What is most comforting is the fact that the productivity of 
labor is regularly increasing, in step with the improvement in the way it is organized… 
wherever the experiment of using army units for labor tasks was carried out with any 
intelligence at all, the results showed that this method is unquestionably viable and 
correct.”85 
Despite initial support from an overwhelming majority of the Bolshevik Party’s 
leaders, including Trotsky’s personal nemeses Zinoviev and Stalin, the labor armies also 
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provoked strong opposition from a surprising cross-section of party members. Local party 
bosses were enraged to find that the soldiers were usurping control of economic 
enterprises formerly under their jurisdiction. Communists on the left decried what they 
saw as a power grab by the military at the expense of what little remained of the 
Revolution’s democratic and egalitarian roots.  No resistance was more portentous than 
that offered by representatives of the Central Council of Trade Unions. Union 
functionaries had initially supported the creation of the labor armies on the condition that 
the relations between the unions and the soldiers would be cooperative and collaborative 
in nature. The reality was much different. Red Army laborers acted without consulting 
the local trade unions. The growing disapproval of union members foreshadowed their 
future resistance to the militarization of labor.  
Trotsky’s commitment to transforming the economy received a further boost on 9 
February 1920. En route to the Urals, where he was to conduct a personal inspection of 
the First Labor Army, his command train derailed. Despite his status as one of the most 
powerful men in the Soviet Republic, no one enquired as to his whereabouts for nearly 
twenty-four hours. Meanwhile his train lay buried under several feet of snow less than 
two miles from the nearest station. Local railway operators failed to notice the train was 
missing: local railway workers charged with signaling passing trains has deserted their 
posts. Trotsky was shocked by his personal experience of the collapsing rail system. He 
vented his fury publicly in several publications criticizing the lack of worker discipline. 
He pledged to overcome the problem by brute force: “Everything depends on transport. If 
transport perishes, the country perishes. But workers’ and peasants’ Russia does not want 
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to perish, and it will not perish. It will condemn all those to perish who are hindering its 
escape from the clutches of want and hunger.”86 
The 9th Party Congress, which met from 29 March to 5 April 1920, presented 
Trotsky with an opportunity to advance his remedies for the Soviet economy. Trotsky 
presented a report on the economic situation, “On the Immediate Tasks of Economic 
Construction”, as well as the key-note address on the party’s military policy. Trotsky’s 
emergence as a leading voice for both economic and military policy did not diminish the 
number of detractors, many of whom felt threatened by what they saw as his 
disproportionate share of political power. His report on the economy was copied verbatim 
from an earlier set of thirty-one theses which he had presented to the Central Committee 
on 4 February 1920.  In the wake of this presentation, the Central Committee appointed 
him to deliver the report on the economy at the upcoming Congress. 
In many respects, the thirty-one theses of 1920 resembled the twenty-three theses 
on militarizing labor from 16 December 1919. The new document called on the party to 
apply the experience gained from the construction of the Red Army to questions of labor. 
This could be done by directly transferring military methods into the workplace. The 
report stated: “Inasmuch as the army possesses the greatest amount of experience of mass 
Soviet organization of this type, its methods and procedures must (with all necessary 
modifications) be transferred to the sphere of labor organization, with direct utilization of 
the experience of those workers who have been moved from military to economic 
work.”87 All factory work was to be based on a national plan for the economy approved 
by the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. Military discipline would be applied to 
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the workforce, so that absenteeism and low productivity could be met with the strictest 
punishments. Labor service was to become a duty for all Soviet citizens capable of 
working. A military-style campaign to “conscript” the peasantry for labor outside of 
agriculture would be conducted:  peasants and unemployed workers would be compelled 
to fell timber, to mine coal and iron, to transport goods, and generally to aid in the 
performance of tasks considered useful by the party. Skilled laborers would be 
conscripted for service in the nation’s factories in a campaign directed under the joint 
auspices of the War Commissariat and the Central Council of Trade Unions. Unions 
would see their role in crafting economic policy and advocating for the rights of workers 
replaced, as unions themselves were to be transformed into organs of state power. Strikes 
were to be made illegal and treated as revolts against the state. Lastly, the theses formally 
endorsed the creation of the labor armies and called for continuing the transformation of 
Red Army units into militarized production brigades. Following the lead of the Central 
Committee, the Congress endorsed Trotsky’s report. 
Three groups in the party emerged to oppose Trotsky’s proposals: the Bolshevik 
right, the “democratic centralists”, and the trade union bureaucracy. Members on the right 
of the party’s political spectrum thought Trotsky’s emphasis on compulsory labor would 
reduce economic productivity. The leading spokesman for this group was the Chairman 
of the Supreme Council of National Economy, Alexei Rykov. Trotsky attacked Rykov’s 
claims by arguing that compulsion is necessary for the construction of a socialist 
economy. Trotsky contended that people are naturally lazy and will work only if 
compelled to by some outside force. Since the labor market no longer existed, the 
Bolshevik state would have to provide an alternative: namely, a “rational, scientific” plan 
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for the economy. He even asserted that workers would embrace compulsion, because they 
shared the goal of building socialism. Vladimir Brovkin described Trotsky’s logic as 
follows: “Since the state was a workers’ and socialist state, its compulsion of the workers 
should not be feared, because in the end it had the workers’ best interests in mind.”88 
A larger group of opponents, known as the “democratic centralists,” drew support 
from the trade unions to attack the resolution on broader grounds. The leading spokesmen 
for this group were Timofei Sapronov and Nikolai Osinsky. The democratic centralists 
labeled Trotsky a modern day “Arakcheev.” They considered his demands for the 
militarization of labor to be a twentieth-century redux of the brutal nineteenth-century 
military settlements sponsored by Arakcheev. By restricting the movement of workers 
and subjecting them to military discipline, the Soviet regime would be enserfing its own 
citizens. Osinsky argued that the consequences of this militarization would also have a 
deleterious effect on the party. Internal party democracy could not survive in a state 
where all aspects of life were governed by military methods. Sapronov went a step 
further and argued that militarization would replace the dictatorship of the proletariat 
with a dictatorship of the bureaucrats. Brovkin reformulated this argument: “If socialism, 
he argued, actually meant the dictatorship of appointed bureaucrats who fulfill orders, 
why then all this talk about the dictatorship of the proletariat, which supposedly exists; 
why then all this talk about workers’ self-organization and independent activity?”89 
The democratic centralists received support from members of the trade unions. 
Union members supported many points of Trotsky’s report, including a national plan for 
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the economy and the mobilization of the peasantry, but they objected to the proposed 
transformation of the trade unions’ responsibilities and to proposed limitations on the 
rights of workers. Prior to the 9th Congress, union officials had enjoyed key posts in 
economic institutions and had played an important role in drafting economic policy. 
Union officials had also been responsible for mediating conflicts in the workplace, and 
had considered themselves effective advocates for the interests of the proletariat. Under 
Trotsky’s plan, their main function would be to enforce the mobilization of the proletariat 
on military lines. Since strikes were to be made illegal and the unions would no longer be 
able to mediate on behalf of workers, the proletariat’s well-being would decline.  
Trotsky attacked these critics with special force: he labeled them “Menshevik-SR 
traitors.” He equated their attack on compulsory labor with an attack on socialism itself. 
If the state was not allowed to direct the economy by compelling workers to provide their 
labor power, the only alternative was some form of market organization. Trotsky stated: 
“After recognizing that we are on the road to socialism, the Mensheviks hurl themselves 
with all the greater ferocity upon those methods without which, in the harsh and difficult 
conditions of the present time, the transition to socialism cannot be accomplished.”90 
Without directly addressing the merits of their argument, Trotsky attempted to tar his 
opponents as counter-revolutionaries. His equating of the democratic centralists’ position 
with a betrayal of the party was portentous of the manner in which inner-party dissent 
would soon be handled.  
Trotsky was also responsible for delivering the party’s report on current military 
policy. He confidently predicted the imminent defeat of internal opposition, and with it 
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an end to the civil war. He argued that an end to the war must be met with a change in the 
party’s approach to military affairs. In a complete reversal of his position at the 8th 
Congress, he now called on the party to approve the transition to a militia-based army. He 
claimed that his new stance was really just the logical extension of his earlier posture, 
which had called for adopting a militia once the threat of military defeat had passed. The 
remnants of Denikin’s army in the Crimea were all that remained of last year’s powerful 
White armies. Peace was at hand, and now the transformation of Soviet military forces 
could finally begin. He linked the future militia to the militarization of labor. As workers 
were mobilized in a military fashion to rebuild the economy, they would simultaneously 
receive training to bear arms. After finishing their military training, they would formally 
constitute a militia unit based in their place of work. Benvenuti described the change: 
“Now that the mobilization of labor was to provide the workforce with military discipline 
and training, it was plain to see that the conscript workers’ units constituted a territorially 
based levy.”91  Trotsky’s plan would also retain the best units of the Red Army in a much 
smaller standard army operating alongside the territorial militias. In reality, Trotsky’s 
proposal was a hybrid of the current system and of an exclusively militia-based army. 
The Congress overwhelmingly passed a resolution advanced by Trotsky calling for the 
creation of a mixed force. This transition to a new type of army was contingent upon an 
end to large-scale military operations, and would not begin in earnest till the last of the 
White armies had been completely annihilated.  
Not everyone in the party was content with the partial transition envisioned in 
Trotsky’s resolution. Nikolai Podvoisky, the head of the Universal Military Training 
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Administration (Vsevobuch), sought to transform his insignificant auxiliary training 
department into the pillar of a militia-based force. The resolution passed at the Congress 
had called for a transition to a mixed army after the end of hostilities, but Podvoisky 
pressed for an immediate and total transformation of the Red Army. He drew attention to 
the fact that all prior party resolutions had described the standing army as a temporary 
measure to be maintained for the duration of the civil war. The lack of effective 
resistance by the Bolsheviks’ enemies meant the civil war was no longer a sufficient 
reason to delay reform. Podvoisky made his case for a total shift to a militia-based system 
on both pragmatic and ideological grounds. The costs of maintaining a standing army that 
was now close to five-million strong put a great deal of stress on an economy that was 
already close to the breaking point. If the party wanted to dedicate itself to rebuilding the 
productive forces of society, it would have to divert resources away from the military. 
Von Hagen restated Podvoisky’s case: “On purely practical grounds, he argued that the 
economic devastation of the country made the demobilization, or at least partial 
demobilization, of the army imperative: the nation simply could not afford to support a 
vast military machine.”92 Podvoisky argued that a transition to an army composed 
entirely of militia units would allow soldiers to act simultaneously as productive workers. 
To bolster his claims, he pointed to the arguments of none other than Trotsky concerning 
the militia’s role in the militarization of labor. Podvoisky described the militia as a force 
capable of fighting for the Soviet state, and capable as well of rebuilding the economy. 
The cost of maintaining the militia would be a fraction of the cost of fielding a massive 
regular army. Opponents of the militia system parried Podvoisky’s case by pointing to the 
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ongoing nature of hostilities. These opponents successfully argued that, until the last of 
the Whites had been defeated, it would be foolish to implement any changes as extreme 
as those advocated by Podvoisky. At least some units organized in a “regular” fashion 
were the best guarantee of a swift military victory. In the end, even Podvoisky went along 
with the Congress’ official resolution on hostilities. Radical reform would have to wait. 
Podvoisky temporarily conceded his point, but remained as committed as ever to the idea 
of a universal militia. He renewed his push at the first available opportunity. 
The 9th Congress allowed Trotsky to emerge as a leading light on transportation 
issues. Transport was crucial to the economy and the Red Army; its near total collapse 
had severely impaired both. The party had long ago confirmed Trotsky as the leading 
authority on military policy, but now it had begun to adopt Trotsky’s prescriptions for the 
economy by entrusting him with the task of restoring the transport system. In early March 
1920 the Central Committee appointed Trotsky Commissar for Transport. He quickly 
drew up a program that would overhaul the nation’s rail system. Prior to Trotsky’s 
appointment, the transport system had been administered by twenty-eight regional 
bureaucracies. His plan called for replacing this system with a central administration run 
from Moscow. The entire rail network was to be subjected to military discipline. Strikes 
were to be immediately declared illegal, and absenteeism would be punished as desertion. 
One-man rule (edinolichnost’), in which a single local official would be held personally 
responsible for the performance of his production unit, was to be implemented. This 
official would also have sole command of those under him, putting an end to collegial 
forms of administration. Last but not least, the railroad union (Tsekprofsoiuz) was to be 
radically reorganized. The union would give up its function as an advocate for railway-
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men. Now its sole charge would be to act as an organ of the state in charge of railroad 
administration, with local union officials acting the part of managers.  
At the 9th Congress, Trotsky’s outline for a new transport policy was 
enthusiastically endorsed, and his new position in the Commissariat of Transport was 
confirmed. The move to establish the transport union as an administrative organ of the 
state was in keeping with a larger redefinition of the role of the unions endorsed at the 
Congress. The trade unions were to represent the party and build support for its policies. 
Trotsky anticipated that his vision for the transport system would be resisted by the the 
railway workers. He called on the Congress to endorse his proposal to use the party 
organization in the Commissariat of Transport, the Glavpolitput, as an instrument to 
insure his directives were carried out. Officials of Glavpolitput would be tasked with 
traveling the country and personally implementing the railway reform. Workers and 
bureaucrats who attempted to obstruct the reorganization of transport would be arrested. 
The party endorsed this proposal, as well as the rest of Trotsky’s reforms. The 
transportation sector was now firmly under his control. His dedication to fixing 
transportation was apparent, but his methods promised conflict with those already 
working in transport. Rosenberg outlined the problem: “Trotsky approached his new post 
not only with the energy and disposition he showed in building the Red Army and the 
determination to apply military methods to transport, but also with an evident prejudice 
against railroad workers generally, whom he regarded as untrustworthy and backward.”93 
The 9th Party Congress marked the peak of Trotsky’s political power. He 
commanded both the transport sector and the military. He was also a leading authority in 
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formulating the state’s economic program. Trotsky was second only to Lenin in the 
power that he exercised over the direction of the Soviet state. His plans for the economy, 
military, and the railways had all been approved by the party and were now government 
policy. Despite his numerous victories, however, Trotsky had elicited the jealousies of 
less powerful party members who might otherwise have agreed with his proposals. What 
is more, a growing number of left-wing Bolsheviks saw Trotsky’s ideals as a betrayal of 
the principles of the October Revolution. The Bolsheviks had seized power while 
advocating worker control of the state and attacking the militarization of Russian society. 
Trotsky’s opponents on the left argued that he was now enforcing government control of 
the workers in a state that more closely resembled a regular army than a proletarian 
democracy.  The Bolsheviks had justified many of their authoritarian policies as 
temporary measures introduced to win the war. With the conflict winding down, more 
and more party members began to call for an end to these unpopular policies.  
Hopes for an imminent return to peace proved short-lived. Growing tensions on 
the Soviet state’s western borders would soon boil over into full-scale warfare. The end 
of the First World War had brought with it the birth of over half a dozen new states in 
Central and Eastern Europe, including the Republic of Poland. The new Polish state was 
created from territory that had previously belonged to the German, Russian, and Austro-
Hungarian Empires. It drew on the memory of a Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that 
had once stretched from the Baltic to the Black Seas. The Commonwealth had suffered a 
number of military defeats in the early modern era that culminated at the end of the 
eighteenth century with its partition among the three aforementioned empires. The Polish 
Republic’s new leader and commander-in-chief, Jozef Pilsudski had been born in the 
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Commonwealth’s old capital of Wilno, a city that in 1918 was located on the disputed 
borders of Lithuania, Poland and Soviet Russia.  Pilsudski dreamed of reviving the old 
Commonwealth in the form of a Polish-dominated federation of states that would 
encompass most of the former Russian Empire’s eastern borderlands. His territorial 
ambitions almost immediately brought the Polish Republic into conflict with the nascent 
Soviet state. As the historian Norman Davies noted: “Pilsudski argued that Poland, as the 
strongest state, had a duty to guarantee the conditions of self-determination for all the 
nations in the area. Needless to say, they took no account of the plans and aspirations 
existing in Moscow.”94 
The first battles between Poles and Bolsheviks occurred in early 1919. Minor 
skirmishes were followed by a Polish offensive beginning in March that culminated in 
Pilsudski’s personal supervision of a successful assault on Wilno in April. The Polish 
advance continued at a much slower pace throughout the summer, virtually halting after 
the capture of Minsk on 8 August 1919. Throughout 1919 the Red Army had been too 
busy fighting internal enemies to devote much attention to the Polish threat. Despite their 
temporary advantage, the Poles were prevented from capitalizing on the situation by their 
own weaknesses. The Polish Republic was less than a year old; it was attempting to 
engage in combat operations while the administrative structure of the state was still under 
construction. Organizational problems were compounded by a lack of military supplies 
and political infighting. Davies described the reigning disorder: “Units with French rifles 
were issued with German ammunition; Austrian officers resented serving under Tsarist 
colleagues whom they had ‘defeated’; Poznanian units disliked serving in the east when 
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Poznan was still threatened by the Germans in the west.”95 When the Bolshevik state 
seemed to be on the verge of collapse in October 1919, Pilsudski refused to assist in 
delivering a death blow to the Reds by coordinating attacks with the White forces. After 
the Whites had been defeated, Poland was then left to face the Bolsheviks largely on its 
own. At the beginning of 1920, Pilsudski began to hatch a plan for a decisive Polish 
victory on its eastern borders. 
In early 1919 the Red Army had attempted to parry the Polish attacks with little 
success. In summer and fall 1919 the growing threat of defeat in the civil war had led the 
Bolsheviks cautiously to explore the prospects for peace with Poland. Leading 
Bolsheviks, including Trotsky, believed that peace in the west would help the Red 
Army’s prospects for victory over its internal enemies. In July 1919, Julian Marchlewski, 
a Polish communist, was dispatched to negotiate with the Poles towards this end. 
Negotiations proved futile, so Marchlewski returned to Moscow empty-handed on 30 
July 1919. The Bolshevik Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Grigory Chicherin, addressed 
repeated peace offers to the Poles throughout the fall of 1919, without success. When 
Pilsudski refused to join Denikin’s push towards Moscow in October, the prospects for 
peace seemed brighter. On 3 November 1919 Pilsudski offered the Bolsheviks ceasefire 
terms that would preserve Polish gains in the west. Trotsky lobbied the Central 
Committee to accept the terms, but the negotiations halted when Lenin criticized the 
Poles for their continued support of the Ukrainian nationalist Simon Petliura. By January 
1920, it was clear peace could not be negotiated, so Trotsky reversed his position as 
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advocate for peace with Poland. On 10 March 1920 he signed off on a plan that would 
deploy nearly 200,000 Red Army soldiers on the western border by the end of April.  
The deployment never had a chance to come to fruition. Pilsudski realized that 
Poland’s chances for victory would be slim, if the Bolsheviks were given the opportunity 
to deploy the full strength of the Red Army against them. To prevent it, Pilsudski 
gambled on a pre-emptive attack. Polish troops invaded Ukraine, followed by Ukrainian 
forces of Simon Petliura. It was hoped that the Ukrainian population would rally to the 
support of Petliura’s puppet government and would help the Poles to drive out the 
Bolsheviks. After the Red Army had been driven from Ukraine, the Poles would 
capitalize on their strategic advantage to sue for peace. Poland would then be largely 
protected from the Soviets by a new buffer state, and Pilsudski’s dream of an Eastern 
European federation would be one step closer to reality. The Polish Army began to 
mobilize for the planned offensive in early spring 1920. The offensive was to begin in 
earnest no later than the first week of May. 
On 5 March 1920 the Polish Army launched a successful but limited offensive 
around Mozyr that effectively separated the Red Army units operating on the north and 
south of the western front. The northern group would not be able to come to the defense 
of Soviet forces in Ukraine without breaking through the Polish forces deployed in their 
way. The Poles spent the rest of March and most of April reinforcing their positions 
around the border with Ukraine. On 24 April the Polish forces struck. Four Polish army 
groups with over 52,000 men stormed from the west and northwest across the lightly 
defended border. Soviet forces on the Polish border of the Southwestern Front numbered 
somewhere between 12,000 to 28,000 soldiers capable of bearing arms (the numbers are 
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disputed). Regardless, the Poles held at least a 2-to-1 advantage over their foes, so the 
Polish forces advanced rapidly. Within two weeks they had occupied Kiev with only 
minimal losses. Still, ominously, the Twelfth and Fourteenth Red Armies had retreated 
largely intact, and the Poles had yet to score a decisive victory in any major battle. Davies 
highlighted the initial results of the Polish invasion: “From the Polish point of view the 
results were only moderately encouraging. They had gained an enormous tract of 
territory; but had failed to trap the enemy.”96 
This failure to trap the Bolshevik units did not bode well for the Polish Army. 
Even worse, the local population had greeted the invading Poles and their Ukrainian 
puppet government with indifference or outright hostility. A combination of the 
widespread fear that a Polish victory would put an end to land reform and of anti-Polish 
Ukrainian nationalism led even militant anti-Bolsheviks to look on the Polish occupation 
with disfavor. When the Bolsheviks began successfully to push back against the Poles, 
the local population did nothing to stop the Red Army. Even before the Polish invasion, 
the Red Army had been steadily redeploying its forces to the borderlands. On 23 April 
Budyonnyi’s First Cavalry Army embarked from Rostov for Ukraine. In spite of previous 
reversals, the Red Army had mustered three army groups and two special task forces on 
the Southwestern Front by the second week of May. On 12 May 1920 the Polish invasion 
sputtered to a halt on the eastern outskirts of Kiev. From here on out, the Red Army 
would take the offensive.  
On 27 May units of the First Red Cavalry began to reconnoiter Polish positions 
southeast of Kiev. On 31 May they launched a major assault on Polish positions all down 
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the line. After six days of heavy fighting, the First Cavalry scored a decisive 
breakthrough into the rear of the Polish forces; the Polish Third Army was now encircled. 
The rest of the Red Army units on the Southwestern Front now went over to the 
offensive. Davies described the decisive results of the Bolsheviks’ victory: “The 
breakthrough of 5 June started a general advance of the Soviet forces in the south which 
continued unchecked for the next ten weeks.”97 On 10 June 1920 Kiev was retaken. 
Barely a month after the start of the Polish invasion, the Red Army had driven the Poles 
back onto Polish territory. The campaign ended in disaster for the Poles both politically 
and militarily. The Polish invasion had galvanized large sections of the local population 
to support the Bolshevik regime in a manner previously unseen during the civil war. 
Labor activists throughout Europe had mobilized workers to halt shipments of weapons 
and supplies to “the Polish aggressor.” The government of the United Kingdom had 
condemned the invasion and had refused the Poles critical aid.  In the military sphere, 
Poland was now threatened with invasion from two directions in both the north and the 
south. 
In early July 1920, Russian society and the party were united in their desire to 
punish the Polish aggressor. Leading Bolsheviks publicly called for “liberating” Warsaw 
from the “lordly Polish aggressors.” In a move that caught many of his fellow party 
members off guard, Trotsky found himself advocating peace. In summer 1920, the 
Bolsheviks were immersed in negotiations to reopen trade with the West that could 
potentially provide the Soviet state with critical supplies of machine parts, manufactured 
goods, and other scarce commodities. The invasion of Polish territory easily put an end to 
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all that. Trotsky worried about the prospects for any Bolshevik “liberation” of Poland. 
Several leading Bolsheviks, including Feliks Dzerzhinsky, were of Polish extraction. 
These same men now warned the Politburo that any invasion would be met with a surge 
in nationalist sentiment similar to what had occurred in Soviet Russia following the 
Polish occupation of the Ukraine. Trotsky took this warning seriously. He argued that the 
combined threat of Britain’s diplomatic reprisals and Polish resistance did not merit 
further prosecution of the war. He responded enthusiastically when the British offered 
their services as mediators. Deutscher described Trotsky’s actions: “On the same day, 
July 13, Trotsky replied in two messages, urging the Politburo and Chicherin to accept 
British mediation between Russia and Poland, and to aim at an armistice which would 
lead to peace with the Entente as well as with Poland.”98 
Trotsky’s proposal was rebuffed. The Politburo was well aware of the Bolsheviks’ 
military advantage over the Poles and was anxious to press forward. Lenin held out hope 
that a victory in Poland might be the crucial spark to touch off revolution in the west. For 
Lenin, Poland was a bridge for exporting upheaval to Germany and to the more advanced 
nations of Europe. Trotsky resigned himself to working towards a military victory despite 
his misgivings about party military strategy. He called for a total commitment that would 
mobilize all the resources of the Soviet state. Trotsky declared: “The fight will be a fight 
to the death, it will be an extremely intense and severe one…  It follows from all this that 
we must see the war with Poland not as a partial task for the Western front, but as the 
central task for all workers’ and peasants’ Russia.”99 To ensure victory Trotsky presided 
over the assembly of the largest concentration of Soviet forces put together in the civil 
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war period. Under the leadership of Mikhail Tukhachevsky, a strike force of 190,000 
soldiers was assembled on the Western Front to the north of Ukraine. By early July five 
separate army groups had been placed under Tukhachevsky’s command. Soviet forces 
enjoyed a numerical superiority over their Polish opponents by some 50,000 men.  
Events on the Southwestern Front prevented the Bolsheviks from fully 
committing to an attack from two fronts. On 6 June 1920 the remnants of Denikin’s 
Volunteer Army had launched a surprise attack aimed at Red Army forces on the 
Crimean peninsula. These survivors were rallied by their new commander, Baron Pyotr 
Wrangel. Wrangel was a towering figure with sound strategic sense who inspired his 
followers’ respect and devotion. After barely a month in charge, Wrangel had brought the 
Volunteers back from the brink of collapse and restored their fighting spirit. Their 
surprise attack at the beginning of June caught the Bolsheviks by off guard. In a matter of 
days they broke through the Red Army’s strong fortifications, and for nearly a month 
after the Whites proved unbeatable in battle. By the beginning of July, they had 
reconquered the whole of the Crimea and reached the banks of the Don. Wrangel began 
to lay plans for a seaborne invasion of the Kuban. As the Bolsheviks prepared to invade 
Poland, they were forced to divert crucial reserves away from the Southwestern Front to 
contain Wrangel in the Crimea. The brunt of the Soviet attack on Poland would have to 
be borne by Tukhachevsky’s armies alone. Lincoln detailed the situation: “Wrangel’s 
forces now posed a serious danger to Russia’s grain, coal, and oil supplies. By the 
beginning of July, the Bolsheviks knew that they had to take the reborn White Army 
seriously.”100  
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Despite the setbacks in the Southwest, the Bolshevik High Command decided to 
press on with the attack. On 4 July 1920 Tukhachevsky’s men crossed the Berezina river, 
beginning the invasion of Poland. For three days a fierce battle raged, but on 7 July 
Polish resistance crumbled. Ghaia Dmitrievich Ghai and his Third Cavalry Army 
(Kavkor) wreaked havoc on the enemy’s rear. The Poles were forced to retreat across the 
entire Western front in what threatened to turn into a rout. The advance of the Red Army 
proved unstoppable. Over the next three weeks the Polish Army suffered defeat after 
defeat. By early August, Tukhachevksy was within striking distance of Warsaw. On the 
Southwestern Front the Bolsheviks had also gone over to the offensive and had been 
initially successful in driving the Poles back to the gates of Lvov. If all had gone 
according to plan, the Southwestern Front would have continued its advance and linked 
up with its comrades to the North in a two-pronged assault on Warsaw. Unfortunately for 
Trotsky and the Red Army, the Poles in the Southwest managed to halt the Bolsheviks at 
Lvov.  
By this point, Tukhachevsky had lost his advantage in manpower; the Polish 
forces at Warsaw outnumbered the Red Army by 40,000 men--- 156,000 soldiers 
compared to Tukhachevsky’s 116,000. Tukhachevsky’s men, exhausted from three weeks 
of virtually uninterrupted success, suffered from overextended supply lines. What is 
more, the Poles were dug in and enjoyed a tremendous lift in morale. The entire country 
stood behind the Polish Army, in what every Pole believed was a fight for their very 
survival as a nation. Tukhachevsky was in desperate need of assistance from the forces 
on the Southwestern Front if he was to succeed in conquering Warsaw. On August 13 
1920 Trotsky and Sergey Kamenev issued orders to the Twelfth Army and to the First 
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Cavalry Army of the Southwestern Front to make all haste towards Warsaw, just two 
days before Tukhachevsky was to mount his attack.  
The assault on Warsaw commenced on 15 August. After a few isolated victories, 
Tukhachevsky’s forces were stopped. Two days later, Pilsudski initiated a counterattack 
on Tukhachevky’s exposed left flank. By 18 August it was clear that the Bolsheviks’ 
prospects for victory were nonexistent: the five army groups participating in the attack 
would be lucky to escape fully intact. Tukhachevsky hoped in vain for some assistance 
from the Southwest. The First Cavalry did not even attempt to move on Warsaw till 20 
August, two days into the disastrous rout of Tukhachevsky’s forces. Tukhachevsky and 
Trotsky both were quick to suspect foul play. Stalin was the chief political officer of the 
Southwestern Front, and many of the force’s leaders (including Budyonnyi himself) were 
members of what was derisively referred to as the “Tsaritsyn clique.” These men were 
politically loyal to Stalin. Early in the campaign, Stalin had objected to the primacy of 
Tukhachevsky’s force. It certainly did not help matters that Tukhachevsky was perceived 
as a close associate of Trotsky. When the Southwestern Front was slow in coming to 
Tukhachevsky’s assistance, Trotsky accused Stalin of insubordination. Budyonnyi argued 
that the orders had not been clearly articulated and that his forces had been too deeply 
engaged at Lvov to respond quickly. Davies stated: “According to Trotsky, Stalin could 
neither bear to watch Tukhachevsky’s triumph at Warsaw, nor to be overshadowed by 
Tukhachevsky’s political officer.”101 
The question of who was to blame for the Warsaw debacle remained in dispute, 
but the results of the battle were very clear. Tukhachevksy’s defeat at Warsaw was an 
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irreversible setback for the Red Army. Two of five army groups were completely 
annihilated. The men of the Western Front were forced to retreat as quickly as they had 
advanced. Throughout the end of August and during the entirety of September, 
Tukhachevky’s men fled without fielding a successful defense. Trotsky lobbied hard for 
the Politburo to make peace with the Poles. Now was the time to concentrate on 
destroying Wrangel, so that an end to the civil war could be reached before winter. The 
gravest threat to Soviet security was the collapse of the economy, and only peace would 
allow the Bolsheviks to rebuild. Trotsky publicly declared his position at the end of 
September: “We are defending ourselves and fighting for peace. Where the slightest 
possibility exists for us to do this, we strive to safeguard peace for the working people at 
the price not of blood but of concessions.”102 At the beginning of October, even Lenin 
realized the costs of the Polish war were no longer worth it, so the Politburo sued for 
peace. On 12 October 1920 an armistice with Poland was signed; the agreement largely 
preserved the Soviet-Polish borders as they had stood in spring 1920. The Red Army’s 
first foray into foreign war had ended in stalemate. 
Now the full weight of the Red Army would be brought to bear on the meager 
forces of Wrangel’s Volunteers. Wrangel knew the situation was hopeless. A failed 
invasion of the Kuban in early October had cost his men dearly; the White commander 
realized the best he could hope for now was an orderly evacuation of the Crimea. At the 
end of October 1920, Mikhail Frunze was entrusted with the command of five Red Army 
groups in what was to be the final major campaign of the civil war. Wrangel deployed his 
men on the strongly fortified positions of the Perekop, while he organized a fleet of ships 
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to evacuate all who could escape. 7 November 1920, the third anniversary of the October 
Revolution, marked the beginning of the Bolshevik offensive. The forces of the Red 
Army outnumbered the last White forces by 190,000 troops to just 26,000 Volunteers. 
Wrangel’s men fought a courageous holding action, but all that his men could hope for 
was to delay the Bolshevik advance. In this sense, Wrangel’s gambit was successful. A 
handful of courageous men fought valiantly for nine days, while most of their comrades 
escaped by sea. Lincoln noted the final outcome: “On the afternoon of 16 November, 
1920 the last of the Whites--- 145, 693 men, women, and children--- were aboard 126 
ships en route to Constantinople.”103 
After three years of continuous warfare, Trotsky and the Red Army celebrated 
what nearly all believed would to be the end of civil war. Still, the economy was in ruins, 
hundreds of thousands of citizens were starving, and large sections of Russian society 
remained openly hostile to Bolshevik power. The coming months would provide a crucial 
test of the Bolshevik’s ability to maintain their rule. The anxious populace waited to see 
if peace would bring the socialist utopia the Bolsheviks had so earnestly promised. 
Trotsky and those around him in the Soviet elite understood the importance of delivering 
on past promises, but the means to build socialism were fiercely disputed. Trotsky argued 
that the experience of constructing the Red Army illuminated the path forward. 
Egalitarian slogans and utopian promises from before the Revolution would have to be 
abandoned, and the party would have to face difficult realities. To build socialism in a 
backwards country would require tremendous sacrifice from the people and a number of 
ideological compromises by the party.  
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For many Bolsheviks on the left these sacrifices proved too much to ask. War had 
justified unsavory measures, but peace meant the time for accommodation was over. 
These men and women passionately objected to nearly all of Trotsky’s positions: a strong 
party, a mixed military force, the militarization of labor, and the subordination of the 
trade unions to the party. Instead they advocated democratic processes (for socialists and 
those of the proper class background) and worker control, ideals they believed had been 
central to Bolshevik ideology before the Revolution. Even more ominously, a growing 
number of Bolsheviks and communist sympathizers in the armed forces were beginning 
to express their dissatisfaction with government policy. Soldiers being demobilized from 
the Red Army took up arms in the countryside to fend off grain-requisitioning squads. 
Sailors and soldiers from working-class backgrounds called for a return to soviet power 
outside of Bolshevik control in the cities. By late 1920 it was becoming clear that some 
sort of political confrontation between the regime and its critics was inevitable. The gulf 
between Bolshevik rhetoric and the harsh reality of life in the Soviet state was just too 
great to ignore. Trotsky was a leading advocate of many reviled practices. Still, he was 
not without optimism. At the end of 1920 he declared: “Yes, our country is poor, our 
workers’ and peasants’ country is exhausted, but it has the will to fight, to defend its 
future, the free family of workers and peasants which will arise and will raise up our 
economy, which will make this Moscow and our whole country rich, happy, educated, 
and proud that it has shown to all the peoples the road to real freedom and real 
brotherhood.”104 
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Conclusion: Victory or Retreat? 
“The opinion is widespread that the army has completed its historical task and can be 
relegated to the archives. There is a widespread urge to leave the army. A communist 
considers that he became a soldier, a commissar or a commander only because that was 
what was required at the given moment, but what he wants to do now is to build, to 
develop a cultured workers’ state. I should like to give warning that this view of the army 
as something secondary contains a very dangerous element.”- Lev Trotsky, December 
1920105 
 
 The decisive defeat of Wrangel’s forces by November 1920 marked the end of 
meaningful White opposition in the Russian Civil War. Large parts of Siberia and even 
parts of Southern Russia had yet to be fully integrated into the nascent Soviet state, but 
all serious military threats had been defeated. Those forces which still opposed the 
Bolsheviks by force of arms were more bandits than regular armies in their internal 
character. The changing situation left Trotsky in an awkward position. Pressure was 
growing in the Bolshevik Party to relegate the Red Army to a position of secondary 
importance. The questions on the tips of many party members’ tongues were how to 
demobilize the army as quickly as possible and how to reduce the costs of sustaining men 
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under arms. At the 9th Party Conference in September 1920, party members directly 
attacked the Red Army. Von Hagen detailed the outcry: “Delegates complained that the 
constant campaigns to aid the army drained them of resources and that military officials 
had no sympathy for their difficulties.”106 Trotsky conceded that it was important to 
reduce the expense of maintaining the army, but worried the demobilization might 
undermine the Bolsheviks’ defense capabilities. He publicly called for a demobilization 
schedule that would reduce the Red Army’s current peak of five-million soldiers by half 
as early as spring 1921. Still, he cautioned that the Soviet state was not free of danger, 
and said it was therefore foolish to question the Red Army’s relevance.  
 This did not prevent Trotsky from dedicating a growing amount of his time to 
concerns outside of military affairs. He spent much of his energy in the late 1920 and 
early 1921 applying the lessons learned in building the Red Army to the economic 
sphere. In August 1920 he had pointed to delays in military transport headed for Red 
Army units fighting in Poland as a justification for removing the entire leadership of the 
railroad union. In their place, Trotsky established Tsektran, a military-like command 
structure (with himself at the head) that was responsible for all rail and water transport in 
the Soviet state. He had already been acting as Commissar for Transport, but his move to 
establish Tsektran put him in more direct control of day-to-day operations of the transport 
system.  
He claimed the expansion of the methods of the Red Army into transportation was 
necessary for efficiency’s sake, but a widespread backlash soon made itself felt. His 
political opponents accused him of trying unilaterally to assume operational control of 
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another key aspect of the Soviet state. No one was angrier than officials from the unions. 
Daniels described the uproar: “At this stage in the evolution of Soviet Communism, such 
a regime could not escape bitter criticism for its excesses of bureaucratic centralism. The 
criticism was inspired in large measure by principle, especially on the far left.”107 Rather 
than retreat, Trotsky brazenly called on the Bolshevik Party to apply his tactics to wider 
and wider areas of the economy.  He was setting himself up for a political showdown at 
the upcoming 10th Party Congress.  
 Opposition to military-style control of the economy was not limited to party 
members. Growing numbers of Soviet civilians, including men recently demobilized 
from the army, were violently protesting repressive policies in the economic sphere. 
Strikes in the industrial sector were breaking out at an alarming frequency. Brovkin 
recorded the rise in strikes: “According to official statistics of the Commissariat of Labor, 
during the first six months of 1920 there were strikes in 77 percent of the medium- and 
large-size enterprises of Russia.”108 Opposition was even fiercer in the countryside. In 
late 1920 a series of revolts broke out in which tens of thousands of peasants took up 
arms against the Bolsheviks. Fighting was especially fierce in and around Tambov. There 
the party was forced to send in Tukhachevsky and several divisions from the Red Army 
to put down the rebels. Pacification of the local population was so difficult, the 
Bolsheviks abandoned all semblance of restraint. Brovkin recorded their conduct: “There 
was a declaration of war on the entire population. The collection of ‘indemnity’ or the 
seizure of ‘bandit family members’ mean in practice the freedom to loot and rape.”109 
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The Tambov rebellion was crushed in spring 1921, but only at the cost of tens of 
thousands of Bolshevik casualties. The party forfeited any popular support it once had in 
the area. 
 Clearly, Bolshevik policies would have to change if the government was to 
prevent a return to the epic violence of the civil war, but Trotsky stubbornly clung to the 
coercive economic policies, at least for the time being. Any illusions Trotsky or the party 
as a whole might have had about their popularity vanished at Kronstadt. The naval base at 
Kronstadt had been a hotbed of radical politics and a bastion of Bolshevik support since 
before the October Revolution. At the beginning of the civil war period, Kronstadt sailors 
had been dispatched to fight the Bolsheviks’ internal enemies. Much had changed since 
the beginning of the Civil War. Bolshevik policies had grown more repressive but the 
promised socialist utopia had failed to arise. In 1921, life was much worse for the sailors 
of Kronstadt and the working class radicals with whom they affiliated than it had been 
before the October Revolution. The men of Kronstadt began to suspect they had been 
duped. According to these men, the Revolution had brought to power not the working-
classes, but the intellectuals. In their view, the Soviet state was a dictatorship of the 
bureaucracy, not of the proletariat.  
 The sailors’ growing dissatisfaction with the Bolsheviks erupted in early March 
1921.  Repression of striking workers in nearby Petrograd in late February had led to a 
series of meetings amongst the sailors that culminated in the arrest of the leading 
Bolshevik functionaries of Kronstadt on 2 March, 1921. The Moscow government issued 
an ultimatum calling on the sailors to back down, but the sailors had had enough. They 
proclaimed themselves in rebellion against the Soviet state and called on the people to 
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rise up in a “third revolution” to overthrow the Bolshevik government. According to the 
leaders of the Kronstadt garrison, the Bolsheviks had betrayed the Revolution and also 
the interests of the working classes. The historian Israel Getzler summarized the sailors’ 
pronouncements: “Then with utter disregard of ‘reason and the will of the toilers’, they 
who had promised a ‘free kingdom of toil’ and a ‘shining domain of socialism’ instead 
created a ‘bureaucratic socialism of slaves’… With ‘bureaucratic trade unions’ which 
‘fettered workers to their benches’ and turned labor into a ‘new slavery, rather than a 
joy.”110 The Kronstadt sailors had gone from being loyal supporters of the Bolsheviks to 
fervent mutineers. They were attacking the party for betraying the very things for which 
it claimed to stand. Clearly, the Bolsheviks would have to make some drastic changes if 
they were to maintain themselves in power.  
 The 10th Party Congress opened on 8 March, 1921 in an atmosphere of crisis. The 
day before, Mikhail Tukhachevsky had been dispatched to Kronstadt with a force of 
60,000 soldiers to put down the rebellion. A vocal faction within the party calling 
themselves the “Workers’ Opposition” publicly denounced official party policy. Hunger 
in large swathes of Russia had led to full-fledged famine, and thousands were starving. 
To rescue the party from these disasters, Lenin proposed a drastic revision in policy. War 
communism and the militarization of the economy that Trotsky so vocally championed 
would have to be temporarily abandoned in favor of a return to more moderate policies. 
In the face of swelling popular unrest, the party would have to restore economic growth 
and ease tensions with the population at large. Grain requisitioning would be replaced 
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with a tax-in-kind on the peasantry that would allow peasants to keep the bulk of their 
produce and sell it on the market. Private enterprise on a small scale would also be 
legalized. Lenin’s initiatives represented a direct rebuke of Trotsky’s own plans for the 
economy, but, given the desperate circumstances, he rallied a majority of the party to his 
side. The result was the New Economic Policy that would govern the Soviet economy for 
nearly a decade.  
 Having proposed a new approach to the economy, Lenin took measures to crush 
dissent in the party. Trotsky wholeheartedly supported this “attack on factions”.  Leading 
Bolsheviks saw a sinister connection between the rise of organized ultra-left dissent in 
the party and the leftist rebellion at Kronstadt. To meet the threat, the Central Committee 
secured the power to expel party members at will. No party members could run on an 
election platform distinct from the official party line. Any public deviation from this line, 
or “factionalism”, would be met with a dismissal from the party or worse. The new tone 
in party relations was decidedly martial. Daniels described the changes as follows: “1921 
reflected the triumph of the Bolshevik organizational doctrine of 1902 over the practice 
of 1917--- of military discipline and monolithic unity.”111 Unfortunately for Trotsky, the 
party’s intense focus on unity cost him politically. His support for militarization in the 
economy and the controversy surrounding his moves at Tsektran were seized upon by his 
opponents to undermine him and his followers. The three supporters of Trotsky on the 
Secretariat (Yevgeny Preobrazhensky, Nikolai Krestinsky, and Lazar Serebriakov) were 
voted out; they also lost their spots on the Central Committee. Supporters of Trotsky 
fared similarly poorly in local party committees of importance.  
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 The one aspect of policy where Trotsky seemed to have his way at the 10th 
Congress was military affairs. He had spent much of the winter and spring arguing for a 
cautious, gradual approach to the introduction of militia forms. The seriousness of the 
Kronstadt revolt and the many peasant revolts bolstered his claims that it was necessary 
to maintain a large regular component in the army. Podvoisky’s call for an immediate and 
total transformation of the Red Army along the lines of a militia force was decisively 
rejected. Similarly a call to “democratize” party life within the army and adopt structures 
from the civilian sphere was dismissed. The rejection of militarization within the 
economy did not extend to a dismantling of the labor armies, which were left in place by 
the 10th Congress. Still, Trotsky’s political victories in the military sphere were 
moderated by the issue’s diminishing relative importance.  
 The 10th Party Congress came to an end at the same time as the last major military 
operation of the civil war. 16 March 1921 marked the last day of the Congress and the 
beginning of the final assault on Kronstadt. The ice that connected the coastal fortress to 
the land would soon melt, and it was therefore necessary to crush the rebellion 
immediately, at all costs. After initially relying on regular Red Army troops who 
performed poorly, Trotsky realized only soldiers of the most dependable nature could win 
at Kronstadt. On his orders, loyal detachments from the Cheka, local party branches, and 
officer trainees launched suicidal charge after suicidal charge directly at the walls of the 
fort. By the time the Kronstadt rebellion was decisively crushed on 18 March, over 
10,000 men and women had died fighting for the Bolsheviks to suppress the revolt. It is a 
fitting finale to the tragedy of the Russian Civil War that Trotsky’s Red Army was used 
to dispatch sailors who had pledged themselves to the principles of the October 
109 
 
Revolution. Getzler said of the Bolshevik’s victory: “It certainly made sure that prostate 
Kronstadt would not rise again, and that its Soviet democracy would remain but an 
unfulfilled promise of the Russian revolution.”112  
 1921 marked the victory of the Red Army and the Bolshevik state. Trotsky took 
pride in having constructed a lethal military force almost from scratch. But the cost of his 
success was beyond measure. Millions had died in the civil war, and Russia’s economy 
was shattered. The Bolsheviks had lost much of their popular support and were only able 
to maintain themselves in power by brute force. Even many of their radical supporters 
had long since abandoned the regime, as was so glaringly revealed at Kronstadt. What is 
more, by relying on a regular army with a disciplinary code and hierarchical structure 
reminiscent of tsarist times, Trotsky had sacrificed ideological purity for the sake of 
maintaining power. In the future, the Bolsheviks fell again and again into the trap of 
sacrificing their high-minded goals to preserve their hold over Russian society at all 
costs. Similar deviations were made during the construction of political institutions in the 
1920s and in the rebuilding of the economy under the New Economic Policy. Many new 
Party members got their first taste of Soviet life fighting with the Red Army. Trotsky’s 
methods were a reminder that the party would do whatever it had to do to preserve 
Bolshevik power. The lessons of political centralization and violent coercion first learned 
in the civil war were not forgotten in the late 1920s and 1930s, when Stalin sought to 
make a “Second October Revolution” in the countryside. 
 I believe there would have been no Soviet state to remake rural Russia if it had 
not been for Trotsky’s role in creating the Red Army. When Trotsky assumed control of 
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the army at the beginning of 1918, no one else had both the political capital and the 
competence to create an effective fighting force. In February 1918 the nascent Red 
defense forces had attempted to resist the advance of Imperial Germany and had been 
utterly humiliated. This ugly defeat made it clear that drastic reforms in the army were 
needed. Even after the armistice was signed with Germany in 1918, the growing threat of 
the Volunteer Army in the south and restiveness among peasants highlighted the 
Bolsheviks’ precarious position. In recognition of this fact, the Bolshevik Party entrusted 
Trotsky with decisive power to build an army capable of winning a war. Trotsky set 
about his task with sufficient courage to defy the party’s ideological orthodoxy.  
 The result was a Red Army similar to the tsarist army that came before it. Strict 
discipline replaced the collegial camaraderie in favor immediately after the October 
Revolution. Working-class volunteerism was done away with so that conscription could 
provide massive numbers of fresh recruits. Most controversial of all, Trotsky 
compensated for the party’s dearth of military expertise by employing former tsarist 
officers of non-worker class backgrounds. His lack of hesitation in coercing workers 
while simultaneously rewarding “bourgeois” officers enraged many Bolsheviks. To 
assuage concerns surrounding the officer corps’ loyalty, Trotsky implemented a system 
of dual-command with political commissars in each unit responsible for ensuring loyalty 
to the government. The first test for the transformed Red Army came at Kazan in August 
1918. The Red forces were victorious. 
 Trotsky’s use of his vast authority to defy Bolshevik purists led to a political 
backlash at the 8th Party Congress in March 1919. He was forced to defend himself 
against widespread discontent over his politically questionable methods. Fortunately for 
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the Soviet state, he successfully parried these attempts to return to a more “socialist” 
form of military organization. The growing White threat of 1919 forced even his foes to 
concede the utility of Trotsky’s military program. Even when he suffered political 
setbacks in summer 1919, few among his opponents dared to seek an immediate whole-
sale change in his military policies. Trotsky’s reforms helped the Bolsheviks to defeat 
three White armies by the end of the year. Heightened prospects for peace led Trotsky to 
attempt to militarize the economy in spring 1920, but war with Poland interrupted his 
plans. After the Red Army fought Poland to a stalemate in fall 1920, Trotsky once again 
tried to apply Red Army experience to economic reconstruction.  
 The times had changed. The Bolsheviks’ violence and coercion had alienated 
large portions of the citizenry. Raw force was no longer an effective guarantee of 
workers’ and peasants’ participation in the economy.  By using “tsarist” methods to build 
the army, Trotsky had made it more politically palatable to introduce other unorthodox 
methods to build the economy. Trotsky had won the war, but could not consummate his 
victory. His militarized vision of socialism may have been sensible during the civil war, 
but now the Bolsheviks were more concerned with staying in power. If ideals could be 
sacrificed to win a war, there was no reason they couldn’t be overlooked in peacetime to 
maintain power. Bolshevik supporters who believed October 1917 had signified the 
victory of egalitarian beliefs were sorely disappointed: the sailors at Kronstadt had even 
revolted against the Soviet regime, only to be crushed by the Red Army. Over the course 
of the bloody civil war, Trotsky’s actions had shown that the party would hold nothing 
sacred if it threatened their prospects to rule, nothing--- even its own ideals. 
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